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EVEN MORE HONEST THAN EVER 
BEFORE: ABANDONING PRETENSE 
AND RECREATING LEGITIMACY IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 
Leslie Gielow Jacobs* 
In this article, Professor Leslie Gielow Jacobs asserts that 
the Supreme Court, by becoming mired in a formalistic mode of 
reporting decisions, has sacrificed the legitimacy of its interpre-
tive process. She argues that this sacrifice stems from contem-
porary Supreme Court opinions' failure to acknowledge alterna-
tives and value judgments that inevitably are a part of decision 
making. She explores several recent decisions by the Court, not-
ing the detrimental impact of formalism in each. Professor Ja-
cobs then suggests a new method of reporting, defining, and 
structuring its components into a method which can recreate le-
gitimacy in the interpretive process. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Almost one hundred years ago, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr., noted that the "logical form" in which courts deliver judicial opin-
ions conceals an "often ... inarticulate and unconscious judgment" 
which, instead of the reasons the courts recite in the opinions, is "the 
very root and nerve of the whole proceeding. " 1 Despite this astute ob-
servation, little in the presentation of constitutional decision making 
has changed.2 By contrast, the widely shared foundational assump-
• Assistant Professor. McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific. B.A. 1982, Wes-
leyan University; J.D. /985, University of Michigan Law School. 
Thanks to Alan Brownstein, Julie Davies, Joshua Dressler, Eugene /1/ovsky, Matthew Ja-
cobs, and the participants in the McGeorge Faculty Scholarship Workshop for providing helpful 
criticism on earlier drafts of this article. and to Spencer Skeen for his research assistance. This 
article is dedicated to the memory of Andrew Cangelosi. who supplied beach reading that proved 
inspirational. 
I. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 466 (1897). 
2. See Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REv. 827, 865 
(I 988). Posner asserts: • 
Most judicial opinions even in the toughest cases depict the process of reasoning as a logical 
deduction ... from previous decisions or from statutes viewed as transparent sources of rules, 
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364 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1995 
tions that could make this type of logical presentation meaningful no 
longer exist.3 This divergence between judicial practice and modern 
recognitions has profound constitutional implications. Although the 
Supreme Court acknowledges that public acceptance of its constitu-
tional decisions is crucial to its legitimacy,• it remains wedded to a 
method of presenting these decisions that has become increasingly un-
tenable and, perhaps, incredible. The resulting-and worsen-
ing--crisis of legitimacy stems from the disjunction between the rhet-
oric of the Court's opinions and the necessary reality of the 
constitutional decision-making process. 6 
The question of legitimacy is, quite simply, why should the na-
tion-lawyers or laypeople--continue to respect and follow the consti-
tutional meanings articulated by as few as five individuals who hap-
pen to sit on the Supreme Court? The traditional response to this 
question is twofold. First, the Constitution, a document of democratic 
pedigree,6 the general scheme of which we continue to affirm,7 quite 
plausibly commits the function of interpreting the Constitution to the 
judiciary.8 Second, judges, a particularly high breed of lawyer, have 
expertise superior to laypeople in examining the sources of constitu-
tional meaning-the text, its history, and previous cases interpreting 
it-so the constitutional meanings that they articulate are especially 
likely to be correct.9 These reasons have been thought to render the 
Court's constitutional decisions worthy of respect and obedience, even 
by those individuals who may disagree with a particular result. 
and, consistent with the logical form, imply that even the very toughest case has a right and a 
wrong answer and only a fool would doubt that the author of the opinion had hit on the right 
one. 
/d. 
3. See, e.g., Morton J. Horowitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term-Foreword: The Consti-
tution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REv. 30, 33 
(1993) ("As law in the modern world has increasingly cut itself loose from its once-powerful 
grounding in religious sources of authority, it has been challenged to acknowledge, along with 
every other secular field of knowledge, the implications not only of historical change, but also 
changes in historical consciousness.") (citation omitted) . 
4. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,2814 (1992). 
5. Others also have seen a crisis brewing. See Id. at 2885 (Scalia, J ., dissenting) (comparing 
the Court's decision to the Dred Scott decision that led to the Civil War); Horowitz, supra note 3, 
at 33; Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REv. 373, 401-02 (1982) ("The decreas-
ing propensity of the body politic to accord the Supreme Court ultimate authority in constitutional 
interpretation may portend a[] .. . deep[) constitutional crisis.") . 
6. This pedigree, however, is not perfect. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAw 38 (2d ed. 1991) ("[T]he 'we' [who participated in the democratic formation of the Consti-
tution] excluded large numbers of people, including all women, all Indians, and all blacks." ). 
7. See infra note 46. 
8. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 178 (1803); see also PAUL M. BATOR ET 
AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE fEDERAL COURTS AND THE fEDERAL SYSTEM 8-10 (3d ed. 1988); 
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 15-16 (1986). 
9. BICKEL, supra note 8, at 25-26 ("[C]ourts have certain capacities for dealing with mat-
ters of principle that legislatures and executives do not possess. Judges have, or should have, the 
leisure, the training, and the insulation to follow the ways of the scholar in pursuing the ends of 
government."). 
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The traditional model of judicial reasoning is formalism-that is, 
decision makers deduce constitutional meanings from acknowledged 
authoritative sources, which themselves have determinate meanings.10 
Formal legitimacy addresses the crucial concern that unelected consti-
tutional decision makers interpret the law rather than make the law 
according to their own personal preferences.11 It also demonstrates 
that the decision is entitled to respect and obedience because the foun-
dations that lead to the more particular decision are presumptively 
affirmed by all.12 
The modern dilemma is that formalism, as the sole test of the 
legitimacy of the constitutional interpretive process, is no longer tena-
ble.18 All constitutional interpretation requires value judgments.14 
Where the value judgments will be most obvious, however, is where 
they are most hotly disputed.16 It is, of course, in these instances of 
deep controversy that the Court needs most to maintain the legiti-
10. See, e.g., STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 169 
( 1985) ("The classical interpretation of the demand for legitimacy treats it as a demand for legal 
formalism in adjudication."); Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the In-
terpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 179, 181 (1986) (defining 
formalism as "the use of deductive logic to derive the outcome of a case from premises accepted 
as authoritative"). 
I!. See BURTON, supra note 10, at 169 ("The ... model of formal legitimacy ... relies on 
logic to exclude all personal value preferences from the judicial decision."). 
12. See, e.g., Robert H. Bark, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 
IND. L.J. I (1972); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 
HARV. L. REV. I (1959); see a/so RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 40 
( 1990) ("The only prerequisite to being a formalist is having supreme confidence in one's premises 
and in one's methods of deriving conclusions from them"). 
13. My point is not, as some have argued, that logical reasoning is useless as a means of 
legitimating constitutional decisions. See David Kairys, Law and Politics, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 
243, 243-51 (! 984); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 
HARV. L. REv. 1685, 1691-700 (1976); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REv. 
379, 400-18 (1985); Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 
YALE L.J. I, 9-25 (1984); Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 561, 570-72 (1983). Reliance upon principles in constitutional decision making and the disci-
pline of stating them in the judicial opinion help demonstrate the decision's legitimacy. See infra 
part II.A; see also KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECTIVITY 13-56 (1992); Frederick Schauer, 
Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988) [hereinafter Schauer, Formalism] (arguing that "for-
malism"-meaning "decisionmaking according to rule"-should not be categorically condemned). 
My point is simply that a formal justification in a judicial opinion is not always enough to demon-
strate its legitimacy. Even those who argue that judicial reliance on formalism can be valuable 
tend to concede this. See. e.g., Rolf Sartorius, The Justification of the Judicial Decision, 78 ETH-
ICS 171, 173 (1968), reprinted in I LEGAL REASONING 127, 129 (Aulis Aarnio & D. Neil Mac-
Cormick eds. , 1993) ("I have no quarrel with the view that ... principles of 'morality, justice, 
social policy or commonsense' ... can provide grounds for the justification of judicial decisions in 
hard cases."); Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. C'\L· L. REv. 399, 407 (1985) [hereinafter 
Schauer, Easy Cases] (acknowledging that some cases are "hard"). 
14. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 101 (1993) ("There is . . . no 
way for those interpreting the Constitution to avoid moral decisions, even major ones."). 
15. See Schauer, Formalism, supra note 13, at 514 (noting that "terms, like 'liberty' and 
'equality' are pervasively indeterminate" ). 
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macy of its decisions, particularly as against those many individuals 
who passionately disagree. 16 
The modern recognition of the inevitability of value judgments in 
constitutional adjudication, coupled with the traditional assumptions 
about the formal requirements of legitimacy, creates the Court's cur-
rent contradictory and potentially self-destructive behavior. 
"[L]egitimacy," as the Court has recognized, "is a product of [both] 
substance and perception."17 As for the substance of the Court's con-
stitutional interpretation, I do not think that any member of the Court 
today really believes that it meets the requirements of formal legiti-
macy. Rather, I am convinced that the Justices know that they must 
make value judgments in interpreting the Constitution.18 
Moreover, while the Justices most likely do-and, I think, 
should-believe that their constitutional interpretations are "correct," 
I doubt they view them as uniquely so. Instead, they attempt to reach 
the best possible result in the face of complex and conflicting potential 
meanings. 
My concerns stem initially from the contradiction between these 
intuitions about the substance of the Court's constitutional interpre-
tive process and its manner of attempting to create the perception of 
interpretive legitimacy. The vehicle by which the Court communicates 
with the American public is the judicial opinion, which demonstrates 
the legitimacy of the decision by "bear[ing] witness that it was 
reached through the discipline of the pattern of the law."19 Although 
I suspect (and hope) that the Justices have abandoned the idea of 
formal legitimacy as the model of constitutional interpretation, they 
most certainly have not done so in the explanation of their decisions. 
Their decisions consistently portray the constitutional meanings as 
flowing inevitably from the traditional sources of meaning, and deride 
16. See David Lyons, Justification and Judicial Responsibility, 72 CAL. L. REv. 178, 198 
(1984) ("[W]hat needs to be justified is . . . what we do to people who are governed by the law.") 
(emphasis omitted). 
17. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2814 (1992) (P.Jurality opinion). 
18. For example, many constitutional decisions turn on the result of balancing a number of 
different factors. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 
96 YALE L.J. 943, 944 (1987). But the Constitution neither dictates the tests nor indicates how to 
quantify the factors in any given context. Nor does it assign numerical multipliers to these factors 
once we have (somehow) measured their magnitude. It is difficult to deny that value judgments 
drive the quantification of these factors and the inherent multipliers we assign to them. I suspect 
that the Justices, perceptive and intelligent all, do not deny this, at least to themselves. See. e.g., 
Robert W. Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic 
Theory, 67 CAL. L. REv. 1049, 1065 (1979). Bennett notes: 
Usually there will be no way to quantify or otherwise objectify ... cost-benefit balancing 
[under the Equal Protection Clause] .... To recognize that rationality is a function of costs, 
benefits, and alternatives is to recognize that judicial value judgments at some level are una-
voidable even when applying [the] most minimal of constitutional standards. 
/d. 
19. Edward H. Levi, The Nature of Judicial Reasoning, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 395, 409 
(1965). 
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alternate interpretations offered within the same decision as mis-
guided or incorrect. To me, most recent constitutional decisions look 
like shouting matches rather than the honest and thoughtful explana-
tion more likely to engender the respect and willingness to obey that 
legitimacy requires. 20 
The much more dangerous aspect of the contradiction between 
the Court's method and its presentation, however, is that the formalist 
assumptions as to presentation doom the Court to fail by its own stan-
dards and prejudge the interpretive method that will appear most 
plausible.21 Originalists have repeatedly accused the Court of simulta-
neously obscuring the value judgments it makes in its constitutional 
interpretation and arguing that its chosen method of interpretation 
defines "the exclusive source" for principles of interpretation "that are 
independent of the judge's preferences."22 These accusations of decep-
tion will be correct and will undermine respect for the Court's deci-
sions as long as the Court adheres to the formalist assumptions of 
presentation. Moreover, these assumptions will channel the Court's 
decision-making method toward the sources of meaning advocated by 
originalists, thereby obscuring the value judgment to rely upon these 
sources in the first place. 
For those of us who believe that originalist assumptions about 
constitutional interpretation often do not promote the best constitu-
tional meaning, it is particularly important to break this self-defeating 
cycle by exposing the value judgment to rely upon those sources of 
meaning for what they are. The Court must abandon the pretense 
that formalism can legitimate completely its decision making and ac-
cept the challenge of legitimating its constitutional value judgments 
by other methods. 
I suspect that the Court clings to a formalist method of presenta-
tion not so much because of its perceived effectiveness, but because it 
lacks a plausible alternative.28 In this article, therefore, I propose a 
method of constitutional decision making and presentation that explic-
itly embraces, rather than implicitly denies, the inevitable value judg-
ments. Part II uses several recent constitutional decisions to illustrate 
the ways that the formalist assumptions apparent in the Court's opin-
20. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 75 (1930) (speculating that the 
authoritarian tone of judicial decisions stemmed from the childish need for an omnipotent author-
ity figure); Posner, supra note 2, at 834 (noting that "judges' persistence in trying to force legal 
reasoning into the mold of logic ... suggests ... a kind of desperation"). 
21. See CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF 103 (1989) (Most modern philosophies 
"prejudge [visions of the good] irrevocably ... not because they are inspired by one side but 
because this inspiration is hidden, where it can't come up for debate."). 
22. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 265 (1990). 
23. See Posner, supra note 2, at 834 (asserting that judges' continued adherence to formal-
ism in judicial opinion writing "suggests a lack either of confidence or sophistication in alternative 
modes of reasoning"). 
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ions undermine its constitutional interpretive legitimacy. Part III sets 
out the components of a new legitimacy that the Court can obtain 
despite the fact that it must make controversial value judgments in 
constitutional adjudication. Part IV combines these components into a 
structured method of decision making that, when followed and set out 
in the Court's opinions, can earn the Court the legitimacy it so des-
perately seeks. 
II. THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE RHETORIC AND THE 
REALITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETIVE LEGITIMACY 
The Supreme Court's decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey24 
contains its most recent and thorough explication of its view of its own 
constitutional interpretive legitimacy. Casey therefore provides an ex-
cellent starting point for an examination of the widening gulf between 
the Court's view and the necessary reality of constitutional interpre-
tive method. In a joint opinion, a plurality of the Court affirmed the 
"central holding" of Roe v. Wade2 r. that the "liberty" guarantee of 
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause includes a woman's 
right to choose to have an abortion.28 According to the members of 
the Court, the decision whether to affirm the constitutional interpreta-
tion established in Roe raised questions of "legitimacy."27 
The Court's legitimacy is the "source of [its] authority"28 and is 
"a product of [both] substance and perception."29 The substance of 
the Court's legitimacy is "the warrant for the Court's decisions in the 
Constitution and the lesser sources of legal principle on which the 
Court draws."30 The perception of legitimacy comes from the expres-
sion of its substance in "the Court's opinions. " 31 By making "legally 
principled decisions" and displaying their "principled character" in 
judicial opinions, the Court can preserve its legitimacy and, hence, its 
authority "to determine what the Nation's law means and to declare 
what it demands."32 
The Court's description of the substance and perception of legiti-
macy reflects some widely shared understandings. Substantively, the 
24. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,2796 (1992) (plurality opinion of Jus-
tices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter) ; id. at 2855 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment in 
part and dissenting in part); id. at 2873 (Scalia, J ., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part). 
25. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
26. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2816 (plurality opinion) . 
27. /d. at 2814 (plurality opinion) . 
28. !d. (plurality opinion). 
29. /d. (plurality opinion). 
30. /d. (plurality opinion). 
31. ld. (plurality opinion). 
32. /d. (plurality opinion). 
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issue of legitimacy arises because of the nature and limits of "the 
power conferred by the Constitution upon the Judiciary of the United 
States and specifically upon [the Supreme] Court. " 33 In our constitu~ 
tional democracy, laws must be created democratically. Because 
members of the judiciary are not elected, they cannot make law legiti~ 
mately. Instead, they interpret the meanings of laws which another 
branch of government has created democratically. Thus, the crux of 
interpretive legitimacy is that constitutional decision makers stay 
within their authorized role of interpreting the meaning of the Consti~ 
tution;3 " their decisions must be fairly traceable to the constitutional 
text. In a "[n]ation of people who aspire to live according to the rule 
of law,"311 the content of the "law" must be fairly distinguishable from 
the decision makers' personal preferences.36 Consequently, constitu~ 
tional meaning which fluctuates with "change[s] in [the Court's] 
membership"37 would severely damage the Court's legitimacy. The 
Court's function is "to define the liberty of all, not to mandate [its] 
own moral code."38 The Casey plurality, therefore, reached its result 
despite any "personal reluctance" of particular Justices.39 
Although legitimacy in constitutional interpretation requires this 
transcendence of personal preference, it also requires a transcendence 
of generational preference; the Constitution embodies "ideas and aspi~ 
rations that must survive more ages than one."4° Constitutional prin~ 
ciples similarly must be acceptable and affirmable by the broad public 
33. /d. (plurality opinion). 
34. STONE ET AL., supra note 6, at 760; Daniel A. Farber, The Origina/ism Debate: A 
Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1086 (1989); Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution 
as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REv. I , I (1984). 
35. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2816 (plurality opinion). 
36. See, e.g., id. at 2806 (stating that the process of supplying content to constitutional text 
"has not been one where judges have felt free to roam where unguided speculation might take 
them") (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 , 542 (1961) (Harlan, J ., dissenting from dismissal 
on jurisdictional grounds)); id. at 2874 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissent-
ing in part) (accusing the Court of "not wish[ing] to be fettered by any ... limitations on its 
preferences"); BICKEL, supra note 8, at 16 (noting the potential countermajoritarian difficulty of 
judicial review); Bork, supra note 12, at 8 (noting the Court's willingness to abandon the idea of 
original understanding); Stephen M. Feldman, Republican Revival/Interpretive Turn, 1992 WIS. 
L. REv. 679, 704 (noting the problem where "Justices inevitably seem to impose their personal 
values on society"); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term- Foreword: The Forms of 
Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. I, 12-13 (1979) (asserting that judicial interpretation should not rely 
on "personal beliefs"); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpre-
tivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 800 (1983) (noting the Court's rejection of 
the Framers' intent of the Fourteenth Amendment in Brown v. Board of Education). 
37. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2814 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mitchell v. W .T. Grant, 416 U.S. 
600, 636 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting)). 
38. Id. at 2806 (plurality opinion). 
39. /d. a t 2812 (plurality opinion). 
40. /d. at ~833 (plurality opinion); see also BICKEL, supra note 8, at 58 (the function of 
judicial review is to "enunciat[e) and apply[] certain enduring values of our society"); Owen M. 
Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739, 762-63 (1982) ("[T]he Constitution 
... embodies the fundamental public values of our society."). 
I 
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that is subject to constitutional commands.41 Of course, this broad 
public does not necessarily mean the momentary popular majority.42 
Fundamental and enduring principles must differ somehow from the 
political preferences of the day or they would establish no limit at all 
on the actions of the other governmental branches!3 
Fidelity to the broad principles understood to be embodied in the 
Constitution is thus one aspect of the legitimacy of constitutional de-
cisions!• Another aspect of that legitimacy, however, is that the prin-
ciples used in constitutional decision making have continuing signifi-
cance in the present day!11 That is, continuing allegiance to 
constitutional decisions, like our more general allegiance to the struc-
ture of government, depends upon a general public perception that the 
Constitution and the meaning the Court gives it are generally valua-
ble, despite the inevitable disagreement of some with any particular 
decision.46 
Up to this point, the Court offers a widely affirmed definition of 
the substance of its constitutional interpretive legitimacy. Its essence 
is that the Court should interpret the Constitution according to legal 
constraints rather than personal preferences and in a way worthy of 
continuing respect. But in its assumptions about the requirements to 
establish the second aspect of legitimacy-its public perception-the 
41. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2814 (plurality opinion) (Legitimacy " shows itself in the people's 
acceptance of the Judiciary" and the "principled justifications" it offers.). 
42. This point is particularly apposite with respect to constitutional provisions that protect 
minority rights. See. e.g., JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 7 ( 1980) (noting that major-
ity rule "is not the whole story"); see also Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2884 (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (finding it "upsetting" that the meaning of the Constitu-
tion might depend upon "some kind of social consensus"); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 420 
(1908) ("Constitutional questions ... are not settled by even a consensus of present public 
opinion."). 
43. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 42, at 7. 
44. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 34, at 1086 ("Almost no one believes that the original 
understanding is wholly irrelevant to modern-day constitutional interpretation."); Michael J. 
Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitution "Interpretation," 
58 S. CAL. L. REv. 551, 569-70 (stating that the issue that divides originalists and nonoriginalists 
is whether "to accord [the ratifiers' normative judgments] authoritative status"). 
45. See, e.g., SuNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 100 (suggesting that constitutional legitimacy 
comes from "some amalgam of substantive political reasons"); Robin L. West, Constitutional 
Skepticism, 72 B.U. L REV. 765 (1992) (suggesting that we ask whether the values which the 
Constitution embodies are good ones, worthy of respect and continued allegiance); see also Bruce 
A. Ackerman, Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE LJ. 1013, 1023, 1049 (1984) (noting the 
intertemporal difficulty of giving effect to the will of a majority now dead) ; Kenneth L. Karst, 
Woman's Constitution, 1984 DuKE LJ. 447. 486 (asserting that the Constitution designed a 
framework for governing society as it was perceived by men and run by men); Antonin Scalia, 
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U CtN. L REV. 849, 856-61 (1989) (acknowledging that, in 
some instances, originalism may result in meanings that are unacceptable, even to originalists, in 
the present day). 
46. See, e.g., BuRTON, supra note 10, at 201 (stating that in assessing legitimacy, "the 
normative question- whether the legal and political system as a whole merits the allegiance of the 
people-is also important."). 
No.2] RECREATING LEGITIMACY 371 
Court establishes the contradiction that is bound to destroy the legiti-
macy that it seeks to demonstrate. 
Clearly, an important function of the judicial opinion is to create 
the perception of interpretive legitimacy. In particular, the written 
opinion demonstrates that the decision "is not just a bald exercise of 
coercion," or "an expression of the judge's personal predilections."'' 
Rather, the written decision "bear[s] witness that it was reached 
through the discipline of the pattern of the law."48 Even if the opinion 
does not reflect the decision maker's actual reasoning process,'9 the 
exercise of creating the opinion provides an important constraint on 
the decision maker's ability to reach any desired result. 110 Moreover, 
the judicial opinion functions not only to demonstrate that something 
constrained the decision-making process, but also that the constraints 
were appropriate.111 Thus, displaying the decision-making process in 
the judicial opinion enhances its legitimacy both by demonstrating the 
difference between the result and the decision maker's personal pref-
erences, and by offering the display as worthy of public respect.112 
The damaging contradiction derives from the assumption, appar-
ent in the opinions of all the Justices, that creating the perception of 
legitimacy requires a presentation that portrays the decision-making 
process as meeting the demands of formalism.113 Quite briefly, formal 
legitimacy requires that decision makers logically derive their deci-
sions from foundational authorizing principles, which have a legiti-
mating pedigree.114 In its strongest form, the theory provides that only 
"one right answer" exists to many, or most, legal questions.1111 Formal 
47. MARTIN P. GOLDING, LEGAL REASONING 6-10 (1984); see also Levi, supra note 19, at 
411 ("[T]he function of articulated judicial reasoning is to . . . giv[e) some assurance that private 
views are not masquerading behind public views."). 
48. Levi, supra note 19, at 409. 
49. See FRANK, supra note 20; Martin P. Golding, A Note on Discovery and Justification 
in Science and Law, in JUSTIFICATION, Nomos XXVIII 124, 138 (1986) (J. Roland Pennock & 
John W. Chapman eds.), reprinted in I LEGAL REASONING 109 (Aulis Aarnio & D. Neil Mac-
Cormick eds., 1992); Joseph C. Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the 
''Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 ( 1929). 
50. GOLDING, supra note 47, at 9 (" [R]easons ... operate as controls on the process of 
deliberation."). 
51. /d. (" The reasons will have to be regarded by [the audience] as good reasons for the 
decision."). 
52. /d. Golding writes: 
The fact that rational individuals are not persuaded by just any reasons that a judge could 
conceivably give has an important consequence: the reasons have to be more than an expres-
sion of the judge's personal predilections .... [T]he judge will want his or her reasons to be 
reasons that independent observers, especially other judges and lawyers, will find acceptable. 
/d. 
53. See, e.g., BuRTON, supra note I 0, at 170 ( Formal legitimacy "often is taken to define 
legitimacy for adjudication in the U.S. legal system."); Michael S . Moore, The Semantics of 
Judging, 54 S. CAL L. REv. 151 , 160 (" [F]ormalism is celftral to our ideas of law." ) ; Posner, 
supra note 2, at 832. 
54. See sources cited supra note I 0. 
55. See, e.g., BoRK, supra note 22, at 2-3; Ronald Dworkin, No Right Answer?, in LAW, 
MORALITY, AND SOCIETY 58 (P.M .S. Hacker & J . Raz eds., 1977). 
.. ____ _ 
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legitimacy further requires that decision makers determine the Con-
stitution's meaning by reference to its text and history. 118 These foun-
dational meanings, assuming that the decision makers can discern 
them accurately,117 legitimate the decisions as properly grounded in 
the Constitution, independent of the decision makers' preferences, and 
worthy of continuing respect. 
I am quite sure that none of the Justices really believe that the 
Court's constitutional interpretation process, at least in difficult cases, 
can meet the demands of formal legitimacy. Instead, formalism is a 
theory of interpretation that has been widely acknowledged as impos-
sible to achieve. It is an illusion that was sustainable in a time of 
widespread belief in eternal and discoverable universal truths, 118 when 
the citizenry deemed appropriate to evaluate constitutional interpre-
tive legitimacy was relatively homogenous.119 Now, however, almost 
everyone agrees that the traditional sources of constitutional meaning 
do not give definitive answers to difficult constitutional questions.80 
Once outside these sources, the general recognition of the situated na-
ture of truth means that decision makers cannot appeal to universally 
shared understandings to support the chosen constitutional meaning.81 
Moreover, the entry of previously excluded groups as participants in 
the democratic community,82 as well as the general diversification of 
groups represented in American society, means that the community 
that the Constitution addresses reflects an increasingly wide variety of 
perspectives on all sorts of issues, including the appropriate principles 
to inform constitutional meaning. 
56. BURTON, supra note I 0, at 170-71. 
57. Of course, the inability to discern these meanings with certainty is the fatal flaw of 
formal legitimacy. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 2, at 833 (noting that the success of formal rea-
soning requires that the major premise be an "unchallenged given"). 
58. See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 3 (tracing the origin of the view of constitutional mean-
ing as unchanging). 
59. See. e.g., Paul Brest, This Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. 
L. REv. 204, 230 (1980) ("[T]he interests of black Americans were not adequately represented in 
the adoption of the Constitution of 1787 or the fourteenth amendment. Whatever moral consensus 
the Civil War Amendments embodied was among white male property-holders and not the popu-
lation as a whole." ). 
60. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 42, at 1-73 (demonstrating the indeterminacy of a number of 
theories of constitutional interpretation); Steven L. Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and the 
Indeterminate Text: A Preliminary Defense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE L.J. 821, 847 
(1985) (constitutional text is "charitably described as indeterminate"); Barry Friedman, Dialogue 
and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577, 649 (1993) ("[T]he Constitution ... presents an 
easy case on which there is widespread agreement [about its indeterminacy]."); see also BoRK, 
supra note 22, at 163 ("The result of the search [for original understanding] is never perfection .. 
. . "); Scalia, supra note 45, at 856 (noting "the difficulty of applying [originalism] correctly"). 
61. E.g., SuNSTEJN, supra note 14, at 93 ("Reasonable people disagree about what [the 
Constitution] means."). 
62. Since the ratification of the Constitution, African Americans, women, and individuals 
between the ages of 18 and 21 have received the right to vote. U.S. CoNST. amends. XV, XIX, 
XXVI. 
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The Casey plurality indeed hints several times that its decision 
does not necessarily represent the inevitable derivation of a determi-
nate constitutional meaning from established constitutional princi-
ples.63 Nevertheless, the plurality's general description of the Court's 
decision-making process, as well as the overall authoritarian tone of 
presentation, contradicts these scattered acknowledgements of the in-
evitability of value judgments in constitutional adjudication. Under 
the plurality's view, a change in constitutional principle "is ... per-
ceived corr~ctly[] as ... a statement that a prior decision was wrong" 
and thus undermines the Court's legitimacy.u Acknowledging the va-
lidity of alternate choices of constitutional meaning from the one 
adopted in the opinion would undermine the opinion's legitimacy. In-
stead, these choices must be declared "tempting," but "inconsistent 
with our law."86 To persuade the public of its legitimacy, a justifica-
tion for a constitutional decision "must be beyond dispute. " 88 
But dispute is exactly what the formalist mode of presentation 
engenders. Some of the plurality's "principled justifications" relate to 
the force of stare decisis.67 Others more directly relate to the meaning 
of the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty guarantee and the nature of 
the abortion decision.68 They all, however, represent value choices that 
are not dictated uniquely by the traditional sources of constitutional 
meaning that the plurality cites. This fact, contrasted with the formal-
ist and authoritarian mode of the plurality's presentation,69 establishes 
the fundamental contradiction that undermines the legitimacy of the 
constitutional meaning that it articulates. 
Because of this contradiction, the dissenters can accurately ac-
cuse the Justices in the majority of crafting the law according to their 
own preferences in a way that is not entitled to respect. The plural-
ity's version of stare decisis is "newly minted;"70 its "notion of reli-
63. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2806 (1992) (plurality) (constitutional 
interpretation requires the exercise of "reasoned judgment," which is not mechanical); id. at 2808 
("(W)e appreciate the weight of the arguments made on behalf of the State .... "). 
64. /d. at 2815 (plurality). 
65. /d. at 2805 (plurality) (noting that it is tempting, but incorrect, to adopt a theory of 
constitutional interpretation that limits the meaning of liberty in the due process clause to "those 
rights already guaranteed to the individual against federal interference by the express provisions 
of the first eight amendments to the Constitution"); id. at 2874 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) ("[T)he Court's temptation is ... towards systematically eliminating checks 
upon its own power; and it succumbs."); see also BORIC, supra note 22, at 1-2 (noting that it is 
tempting, but incorrect, to adopt a theory of interpretation that allows the Court to expand upon 
express constitutional provisions). 
66. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2814 (plurality). 
67. /d. at 2816 (plurality). 
68. ld. at 2804-08 (plurality). 
69. See Holmes, supra note I, at 457-66 (noting this mode of opinion writing); see also 
Posner, supra note 2, at 865 (same). 
70. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2855 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) . 
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ance," "unconventional and unconvincing;"71 its enunciated standard, 
"rootless;"72 and its derivation of its result from that standard, un-
faithful to it.73 As the Chief Justice points out, the Court's concern 
that it not be perceived to "surrender to political pressure" has "two 
sides."74 According to Justice Scalia, the reasons which the Court in 
Roe and its progeny offer "beg[] the question" by assuming a contro-
versial moral judgment about the status of the fetus that in fact needs 
a defense.711 These criticisms, when not merely plausible but true, un-
dermine the core aspects of the Court's legitimacy. 
By failing to acknowledge the inevitable value choices in constitu-
tional interpretation, the plurality hides, even from itself, the need at 
least to attempt to explain them.78 That is, the plurality deems suffi-
cient the recitation of the formal sources and their chosen meanings. 
Once it becomes apparent, however, that the chosen meanings are not 
uniquely correct, as asserted, it also becomes apparent that the plural-
ity has offered no justification for its choice.77 The choices, quite accu-
rately, appear to be judicial fiat and nothing contradicts the suspicion 
that they stem from the personal preferences of the decision makers. 
These recognitions undermine a legitimacy that depends upon the per-
ception that constitutional decision makers are in some significant 
sense bound by "law." Moreover, by failing to offer any real explana-
tion for its choices, the plurality loses the second aspect of legitimacy, 
which is respect. After all, an unexplained choice is difficult to re-
spect.78 It is also difficult to respect decision makers who either do not 
understand fully or do not want to acknowledge their constitutional 
interpretative process. 79 
Because of the inconsistency between the plurality's decisional 
method and its portrayal of it, Justice Scalia accurately can accuse 
the plurality of "decorat[ing] a value judgment and conceal[ing] a 
political choice."80 In fact, recognizing that the Court is making value 
judgments in constitutional interpretation necessarily changes the ef-
71. /d. at 2862 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
72. /d. at 2878 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
73. /d. at 2861 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) . 
74. !d. at 2865 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 2815). 
75. /d. at 2875 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973) 
("We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins."). 
76. See Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REv. 296 (1990) (arguing that the 
effect of this psychological trick enhances the legitimacy of the judicial decision). 
77. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537, 560 (1982). 
Because of its generality, the concept of equality alone does not answer legal questions. /d. at 551. 
78. Sartorius, supra note 13, at 172 ("[T)he very notion of justification, judicial or other· 
wise, is inseparable from the concept of a good reason for acting in a certain sort of way."). 
79. But see Altman, supra note 76, at 328 (arguing that judicial decision making is more 
legitimate when judges do not fully understand their decision-making process) . 
80. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S . Ct. 2791, 2875 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) . 
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fectiveness of a method of justification that portrays the decision as 
uniquely correct: 
As long as this Court thought (and the people thought) that we 
Justices were doing essentially lawyers' work up here-reading 
text and discerning our society's traditional understanding of 
that text-the public pretty much left us alone. Texts and tradi-
tions are facts to study, not convictions to demonstrate about. 
But if in reality our process of constitutional adjudication con-
sists primarily of making value judgments[,] . .. then a free and 
intelligent people's attitude toward us can be expected to be 
(ought to be) quite different. The people know that their value 
judgments are quite as good as those taught in any law 
school-maybe better .... [If the Court is making value judg-
ments when interpreting the Constitution], then the people 
should demonstrate, to protest that we do not implement their 
values instead of ours.81 
The contradiction between the rhetoric and the reality of the con-
stitutional decision-making process thus sets up the Casey plurality 
for Justice Scalia's attack. Constitutional decision making that in-
volves value judgments is indeed difficult to legitimate according to 
the traditional understanding that the Court must draw decisions 
from the constitutional text which differ demonstrably from the Jus-
tices' preferences.82 When making value judgments, decision makers 
will be strongly tempted to mistake their own preferences for the 
law.83 Should they try to look outside their own preferences, they will 
find that public views on the values embodied in the Constitution that 
are worthy of continuing respect inevitably will differ.84 Moreover, 
even if the public views should reveal some level of consensus, relying 
upon this consensus as the basis for constitutional meaning may not 
legitimate the Court's efforts to interpret the enduring, rather than 
currently popular, constitutional meaning. As Justice Scalia points 
out, the presentation of a constitutional decision as the inevitable re-
sult of the application of established principles exacerbates these 
problems because it obscures what is really going on, thereby poten-
tially allowing judicial fiat to pass for constitutional law.8~ 
For Justice Scalia and other originalists, the answer to the legiti-
macy problem lies in the possibility of returning to a constitutional 
81. !d. at 2884-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
82. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 22, at 265 ("[T]he original understanding of the Constitu· 
tion is the exclusive source" for principles of constitutional interpretation "that are independent of 
the judge's preferences."). 
83. Scalia, supra note 45, at 863. 
84. ALASOAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 6-11 (2d ed. 1984) (detailing how perspectives 
on basic moral questions are incommensurable) . 
85. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2874 (Scalia, J., dissenting)•("(T]he Court does not wish to be 
fettered by any ... limitations on its preferences.") . 
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interpretive process that involves merely "ascertaining an objective 
law."86 Although "value judgments" should not be "dictated,"87 the 
Court legitimately can impose analysis of "texts and traditions," be-
cause this method of interpretation appropriately constrains the Jus-
tices' ability to enact their own preferences into law.88 Missing from 
this analysis, however, is a foundational justification for relying upon 
the originalist sources of meaning in the first place. This omission is a 
value judgment.89 Thus Justice Scalia, too, makes a political choice 
and, with his rhetoric, conceals it.90 
But, in explaining a legitimate decision-making process, the plu-
rality perpetuates the illusion of formal legitimacy and thereby 
strengthens the originalist critique by paralleling its assumptions. Spe-
cifically, by implying that the sources it cites are foundational, the 
plurality structures the debate in originalist terms. The question be-
comes which opinion is most true to the meaning of the presumptively 
authoritative and determinant sources. In this type of debate, original-
ists often will win. Original meaning, according to the particular the-
ory,91 often, although not always, is quite discoverable and determi-
nant.92 Moreover, originalists can claim quite accurately to be better 
able to preclude individual decision makers from relying upon per-
sonal preferences than can interpretive theorists who do not establish 
a hierarchy of particular sources of constitutional meaning.98 This de-
bate, however, fails to address the initial decision to rely upon an 
originalist interpretive method. This value judgment is as controver-
86. Id. at 2884 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
87. /d. at 2885 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
88. Bork, supra note 12, at 1-11; Scalia, supra note 45, at 864. 
89. Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: 
Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 226, 285 (1988) (The decision to use the 
originalist method of interpretation does not involve "a legal choice, but a moral and political 
one."); Earl Maltz, The Miracle at Philadelphia- Foreword: The Appeal of Originalism, 1987 
UTAH L. REv. 773, 774-75; see also SuNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 104; Frank Michelman, Law's 
Republic, 91 YALE L.J. 1493, 1498-99 (1988). 
90. Michael J. Gerhardt, A Tale of Two Textualists: A Critical Comparison of Justices 
Black and Scalia, 74 B.U. L. REv. 25, 27 (1994) (demonstrating that Justice Scalia "relie[s] on 
something outside the constitutional text to interpret it . . . [which are] political and personal 
judgments regarding the proper role of the judiciary"). 
91. See Michael J . Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of Constitutional In-
terpretation, 77 VA. L. REv. 669, 682 ( 1991) (distinguishing sophisticated and unsophisticated 
versions of originalism). 
92. See Kay, supra note 89, at 236-59; Earl M . Maltz, The Failure of Attacks on Constitu-
tional Originalism, 4 CONST. COMMENTARY 43, 50-52 (1987); Perry, supra note 91, at 686 ("The 
serious question is not whether the originalist conception can inform the practice of judicial re-
view- it can- but whether it should inform the practice."). But see H. Jefferson Powell, The 
Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985) (questioning whether, 
even if it is findable and determinant, the framers intended original intent to control constitutional 
interpretation). 
93. See Scalia, supra note 45, at 864 ("Originalism does not aggravate the principal weak-
ness of the system [which is the inevitable tendency of judges to think that the law is what they 
would like it to be], for it establishes a historical criterion that is conceptually quite separate from 
the preferences of the judge himself."). 
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sial as the value judgments which the Court makes when engaged in 
nonoriginalist interpretation.9" But a method of portraying the consti-
tutional decision-making process that assumes the foundational au-
thority of these sources obscures the need to justify them. 
If the decision in Casey were the only example of the contradic-
tion between the rhetoric of the Court's opinions and its necessary 
decision-making process, the prediction of a growing threat to its in-
terpretive legitimacy might be premature. Casey is not, however, an 
anomaly in this respect. Instead, the contradiction pervades and 
threatens the legitimacy of the Court's entire constitutional jurispru-
dence-the more controversial the case, the more obvious the contra-
diction and, thus, the more acute the threat to the Court's legitimacy. 
I will briefly discuss another recent example.911 
Perhaps no area of the Court's constitutional jurisprudence is in 
greater disarray than its interpretation of the Religion Clauses. 
Within this broad category, its decisions regarding public sponsorship 
of religious displays are particularly controversial. The Court's most 
recent decision in this area, County of Allegheny v. ACLU,96 exhibits 
the contradiction between formalist assumptions in presentation and 
the inevitable value judgments in the decisional process. 
The issue in County of Allegheny concerned two holiday dis-
plays, one including a creche and the other including a menorah. The 
creche was surrounded by poinsettias and was located on the grand 
staircase of the Allegheny County Courthouse in downtown Pitts-
burgh. The menorah was located outside the city-county building, also 
in downtown Pittsburgh, along with a Christmas tree and a sign salut-
ing liberty. The ACLU alleged that both displays violated the First 
Amendment Establishment Clause.97 In opinions widely criticized as 
incoherent, various combinations of Justices held the creche display 
unconstitutional and the menorah display constitutional. 
In resolving the issues presented in County of Allegheny, all of 
the Justices start from the premise that the Establishment Clause 
guarantees religious liberty.98 They also agree that the government 
safeguards religious liberty by being "neutral" toward religious be-
94. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 101 ("Acceptance of [the] view [that the original 
understanding is binding] itself rests on a controversial moral foundation."). 
95. I use these two areas of the Court's jurisprudence as examples only. Other areas suffer 
from the same legitimacy problem. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAw Ill (2d ed. 1988) ("The aspect of the Court's standing jurisprudence most open to criticism, 
... is less the underlying view of the role of the federal judiciary this new jurisprudence embodies, 
than the Court's lack of candor in articulating and justifying the basic choice it has made."). 
96. 492 u.s. 573 (1988). 
97. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion . . . . "). 
98. 492 U.S. at 590; id. at 631 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 652 n.ll (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 660 (Kennedy, J ., cbncurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). 
378 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1995 
lief.99 The Justices disagree, however, as to how the government 
achieves the constitutionally required neutrality in the context of the 
displays of religious symbols on government property.100 The Court 
has been struggling for quite a while to identify an alternative to the 
traditional Lemon v. Kurtzman three-part test for determining an Es-
tablishment Clause violation.101 County of Allegheny considers only 
one prong of the test, whether the "principal or primary effect" of the 
holiday displays was "one that neither advance[d] nor inhibit[ed] reli-
gion. " 102 The Justices in the majority and the dissent adopt two differ-
ent standards to determine whether the displays had this unconstitu-
tional effect. 
The majority of Justices apply an endorsement test requiring that 
the government not endorse, i.e., "favor," "prefer," or "promote" reli-
gious beliefs.103 This test "captures the essential command of the Es-
tablishment Clause, namely, that government must not make a per-
son's religious beliefs relevant to his or her standing in the political 
community by conveying a message 'that religion or a particular reli-
gious belief is favored or preferred.' " 10" According to the majority, 
the endorsement test is consistent with previous Court decisions, 106 al-
though those decisions mention it only erratically.106 The test also fol-
lows from the "history and tradition of religious diversity ... that is 
our national heritage."107 Although the test is consistent with the his-
torical meaning of the Establishment Clause, government practices at 
the time of its creation do .not conclusively determine its modern 
meaning.108 The words of the Establishment Clause must be inter-
preted according to their recognized meaning "today," not as they 
99. /d. at 590-94; id. at 627 (O'Connor, 1., concurring); id. at 644 (Brennan, 1., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 655-59, 664, 675-76 (Kennedy, 1., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
100. See infra notes 103-20 and accompanying text. 
101. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). A government action that arguably aids religion does not violate 
the Establishment Clause so long as it: (I) has a secular purpose; (2) has a principal or primary 
effect that does not advance or inhibit religion; and (3) does not give rise to an excessive entangle-
ment between government and religion. /d. at 612-13; see, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. 
Ct. 2481, 2487 (not relying on the Lemon test); id. at 2495 (O'Connor, 1., concurring) (suggesting 
alternatives to the Lemon test); id. at 2505 (Scalia, 1., dissenting) (criticizing the Lemon test). 
I 02. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592; Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. 
103. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593. 
104. /d. at 627 (O'Connor, 1., concurring). 
105. /d. at 591-97; id. at 623-28 (O'Connor, 1., concurring). 
106. For pre-Allegheny majority opinions mentioning the endorsement test, see Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, 1., concurring) (first mentioning the endorsement 
test); Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389-90 (1985); Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 
2356, 2371-72 (1990); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 587 {1987). 
107. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 589; see also id. at 646-50 (Stevens, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the history of the Establishment Clause supports "a 
strong presumption against the display of religious symbols on public property"). 
108. /d. at 590, 603, 605 & n.55; id. at 630 (O'Connor, 1., concurring); id. at 649 (Stevens, 
1., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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may have been understood "in the early days of the Republic."109 
Thus, "[h]istorical acceptance of a practice does not in itself validate 
that practice under the Establishment Clause if the practice violates 
the values protected by that Clause."110 
Rather than using the majority's endorsement test, Justice Ken-
nedy, joined by three other Justices,m would invalidate government 
actions only if they "coerce[ d] anyone to support or participate in any 
religion or its exercise. "112 Under this test, the government coerces 
religious belief when it "in the form of taxation ... suppl[ies] the 
substantial benefits that would sustain a state-established faith, di-
rect[ly compels] observance, or . . . exhort[s] to religiosity [in a way] 
that amounts in fact to proselytizing."113 In particular, "[s]ymbolic 
recognition ... of religious faith" by the government only violates the 
Establishment Clause if it "benefits religion in a way more direct and 
more substantial than practices that are accepted in our national heri-
tage."114 According to Justice Kennedy, this coercion test, rather than 
the endorsement test, is consistent with previous Court decisions,1111 
although certain statements in prior decisions suggesting otherwise 
should not be read with "formalism" or "[t]aken to [their] logical 
extreme."118 This test is also consistent with the Establishment 
Clause's "ultimate constitutional objective as illuminated by his-
tory."117 Yet history, viewed strictly as government practices generally 
accepted at the time that the First Amendment was ratified, is not 
binding.118 Rather, the meaning of the Establishment Clause must be 
interpreted in light of the relationship between the government and 
the people "[i]n this century."119 Consequently, the modern coercion 
test permits government practices, such as "displays commemorating 
religious holidays," even though they were not commonplace in 1791 
if they "have no greater potential for an establishment of religion" 
than "practices two centuries old. " 120 
109. Id. at 590. 
110. /d. at 630 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
Ill. These are Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and Justice Scalia. 
112. 492 U.S. at 659 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) . 
113. /d. at 659-60 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
114. /d. at 661-63 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
115. /d. at 666-68 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (referring to 
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), and Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)). 
116. /d. at 657 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
117. /d. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Walz v. Tax 
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 670-71 (1970)). 
118. /d. at 669 (Kennedy, J ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he relevance 
of history is not confined to the inquiry into whether the challenged practice itself is a part of our 
accepted traditions dating back to the Founding.") . 
119. /d. at 657 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissentin'g in part) . 
120. /d. at 669-70 (Kennedy, J ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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The proponents of both the endorsement and coercion tests thus 
offer principled justifications. Both sides appeal to history121 and pre-
cedent122 to support their preferred tests. Yet, in interpreting the his-
tory, both sides acknowledge that practices at the time that the reli-
gion clauses were created do not bind current constitutional 
meaning.12s Rather, the Justices must choose the relevant historical 
practices and determine their significance as to the modern meaning 
of religious liberty.124 The same precedent, of course, is cited by one 
side and distinguished by the other. 1211 The County of Allegheny deci-
sion thus reveals the task of defining the "neutrality" demanded by 
the Establishment Clause to be the nonneutral one of giving meaning 
to an indeterminate text. 
The substance of the justifications offered by the various opinions 
therefore makes obvious that the choice of constitutional meaning de-
pends upon value judgments, about which perspectives will differ. Al-
though the Justices at several points acknowledge that they must 
"choose" a test to determine constitutional meaning, 126 their portrayal 
in their opinions of their decision-making processes and results is rig-
idly formalistic. Both Justices Blackmun and Kennedy base their con-
clusions on "settled law."127 
According to Justice Blackmun, Justice Kennedy's view repre-
sents "a failure to recognize [a] bedrock Establishment Clause princi-
ple,"128 and "transparently lacks a principled basis, consistent with .. 
. precedent[]."129 Justice Kennedy's claim that the majority's inter-
pretation of the Establishment Clause evidences a "callous indiffer-
ence" to the role of religion in public life is "[far] from the truth," 
"offensive," and "absurd."130 In fact, "[n]o misperception could be 
121. !d. at 589-90; id. at 630-31 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 646-49 (Stevens, J ., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 655-59, 669 (Kennedy, J ., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
122. /d. at 591-97; id. at 623-28 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 655-58, 668-89 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
123. /d. at 590, 603, 605 & n.55; id. at 630 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 649 (Stevens, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 669 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
124. /d. at 630 (O'Connor, J ., concurring) (noting that the long-standing existence of prac-
tices may make it less likely that the practices convey an endorsement of religion, but also noting 
that "historical acceptance of a practice does not in itself validate that practice under the Estab-
lishment Clause if the practice violates the values protected by that Clause."); id. at 671 & n.8 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (listing presidential Thanksgiving Day 
proclamations as evidence of a relevant tradition, but noting that Thomas Jefferson declined to 
follow this tradition due to his strict views of the degree of separation mandated by the Establish-
ment Clause). 
125. /d. at 662 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (relying on Lynch 
and Marsh); id. at 602-03 (Blackmun, J., distinguishing them). 
126. /d. at 609; id. at 670 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) . 
127. /d. at 590; id. at 669 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
128. ld. at 605. 
129. /d. at 610 n.57. 
130. !d. at 610. 
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more antithetical to the values embodied in the Establishment 
Clause."131 Rather, it is "incontrovertible that the Court's decision .. 
. represent[s] ... the respect for religious diversity that the Constitu-
tion requires. " 132 
Similarly, Justice Kennedy finds the majority's reasoning "quite 
confusing,"133 and marvels at "the depth of its error."13" Its adoption 
of the endorsement test is "troubling," and its result, "bizarre."1311 
The majority "disregard[s] precedent and historical fact,"136 and 
"lends its assistance to an Orwellian rewriting of history."137 Its ap-
proach "contradicts important values embodied in the [Establish-
ment] Clause."138 The view consistent "with our history and our 
precedents"139 is that the decisions of a local government to permit 
the holiday displays at issue represent "matters of taste" over which 
the "written Constitution" gives the Court "no jurisdiction."Ho 
Justice Scalia does not participate in the decision in County of 
Allegheny and, therefore, is not available to provide caustic commen-
tary detailing the inconsistency between the formalist rhetoric of the 
opinions and the value judgments upon which the constitutional mean-
ings necessarily rely.1" 1 Nevertheless, the many opinions in County of 
Allegheny reveal, without the need for explicit commentary, that prin-
cipled justification can be offered in support of a number of different 
constitutional meanings. This recognition dissipates the justificatory 
power of the rhetoric. As in Casey, once it becomes clear that the 
decision making in fact involves value judgments that the Court can-
not justify solely by reference to the text and precedent, then efforts 
to do so appear naive or duplicitous. Because the formal justification 
starts after the Court has made its value choices, the reasons it offers 
do not explain the choices in a way that could possibly legitimate 
them.H2 The opinions devolve to a shouting match, and efforts to offer 
a "principled justification" for the constitutional interpretation start 
131. ld. 
132. /d. at 613. 
133. /d. at 668 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
134. ld. at 668 n.6 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) . 
135. ld. at 669 (Kennedy, J ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
136. ld. at 674 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
137. /d. at 678 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
138. Jd. at 677 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
139. ld. at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
140. /d. at 679 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
141. Such commentary from other Establishment Clause decisions in which Justice Scalia 
dissented helps fill the gap. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Grumet, I 14 S. Ct. 2481, 2506 (1994) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Once this Court has abandoned text and history as guides, nothing pre-
vents it from calling religious toleration the establishment of religion."). 
142. See David Lyons, Justification and Judicial Responsibility, 72 CAL. L. REv. 178, 182 
(1984) ("Th{e] availability of [reasonable, respectable] legal arguments on both sides [of hard 
cases] means that the relevant point of law can be decided, if at all, only by nondeductive argu-
ments which take conflicting considerations into account."). 
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to look exactly like what they cannot legitimately be-naked exercises 
of judicial power and impositions of judicial preferences. 148 
In sum, the Court's continued adherence to formalism in the 
presentation of its constitutional decisions subverts the legitimacy that 
it tries to maintain. The Court appears disingenuous or naive by 
claiming not to do what it obviously must. Justice Scalia, an eloquent 
spokesperson for an originalist interpretive method who quite accu-
rately identifies and criticizes the Court's inconsistencies, aids in this 
appearance. Perhaps most important, by failing to acknowledge its 
value choices, the Court also has failed to begin the work of trying to 
justify sources of meaning as other than undisputedly authoritative. In 
a nation "dedicated to the rule of law,"14" but without such founda-
tional sources of meaning, the time to begin the work of defining and 
following the path of an alternate legitimacy has arrived. 
III. COMPONENTS OF A NEW LEGITIMACY 
If, as I argue, the crux of the Court's legitimacy problem stems 
from the widening chasm between what it claims it is doing in inter-
preting the Constitution and what it realistically can be doing, then 
the cure would appear to be to close the gap by harmonizing the 
Court's manner of presenting its decisions with its actual decision-
making process. Specifically, the Court could acknowledge the value 
choices that it makes and explain the actual underlying reasons. 1411 
Why doesn't the Court do this? I suspect the Court has several 
reasons for its continued adherence to what I view as an outdated and 
counterproductive mode of presenting its decisions. One reason is sim-
ple force of habit. Changing a method of presentation that has be-
come ingrained in the very idea of what a judicial opinion should be is 
indeed difficult. A second reason supports the force-of-habit explana: 
tion with the if-it's-not-broken-don't-fix-it rationale. My purpose in 
Part II was to demonstrate that the formal mode of presentation is 
defective, and that its inadequacies are becoming increasingly obvious. 
143. Others have ·noted that legal language of objectivity and neutrality can disguise what is 
actJlally a naked imposition of preferences that are not universal. For critical legal scholars mak-
ing this point, see, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 13, at 1731-37; Tushnet, supra note 36, at 804-24; 
Unger, supra note 13, at 655-60. For feminist legal theorists, see, e.g., Katherine T. Bartlett, 
Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829, 877 (!990); Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking 
Women's Silence in lAw: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE · 
DAME L. REv. 886 (1989); Martha Minow, Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10, 38-45. 
For critical race theorists, see, e.g., Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and 
Racial Politics, 97 YALE L.J. 1609, 1611 (1988); Richard Delgado, The Inward Turn in Outsider 
Jurisprudence, 34 WM. & MARY L. REv. 741, 748 (!993). 
144. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2814 (1992) (plurality). 
145. See, e.g., FRANK, supra note 20; Robert A. Leftar, Honest Judicial Opinions, 74 Nw. 
U. L. REv. 721 (1979); David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 
(1987); Singer, supra note 13. 
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To me, the shrill tones of the Court's most controversial constitutional 
decisions indicate that the Justices themselves are aware of this grow-
ing problem. In fact, I suspect that the Court's continued adherence 
to a formal mode of presentation stems not so much from the per-
ceived efficacy of the presentation as from the failure to perceive al-
ternate manners of presentation that could create the perception of 
legitimacy. That is, if the only alternative to formal legitimacy is the 
abyss of relativism, 148 perhaps it is better to perpetuate the illusion of 
formal legitimacy for as long as possible.147 
Like the Court, I am not sure an alternative to formal legitimacy 
exists. I am more sure, however, that formal legitimacy does not work. 
It is on that commitment, therefore, that I believe it appropriate to 
act. We need to define a legitimacy that does not depend upon indis-
putable foundational sources of constitutional meaning. The Court 
can play a role in doing this. In this Part, I offer components of a 
· revised understanding of legitimacy, which, if displayed in a judicial 
opinion, could help demonstrate the crucial components of legiti-
macy-that the decision reflects law rather than the personal prefer-
ences of the decision makers, and that the content of that law is wor-
thy of public respect: 
A. Principled Decision Making 
"[P]rincipled justification," according to the Court, is the essence 
of the "judicial act."148 A "principled decision" is "one that rests on 
reasons with respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that in their 
generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is 
involved."149 Thus, principles are a particular type of reason that have 
been, and continue to be, viewed as crucial to establishing the legiti-
macy of the Court's constitutional interpretations.1&0 
I will offer here the classic understanding-apparent, I believe, in 
the Court's opinions-of how reliance upon principles in constitutional 
146. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 40, at 741 (describing a "new nihilism" that holds that "for 
any text-particularly such a comprehensive text as the Constitution-there are any number of 
possible meanings, that interpretation consists of choosing one of those meanings, and that in this 
selection process the judge will inevitably express his own values"); Morris R. Cohen, On Absolu-
tism in Legal Thought, 84 U. PA. L. REv. 681, 699 (1936) (criticizing "a nihilistic absolutism 
according to which there can be 'no logical certainty in the law at all."). 
147. Joseph Vining, Legal Affinities, 23 GA. L. REv. 1035, 1049 (1989) ("Law must at least 
be aware of the possible value of illusion, the possible necessity of it."). 
148. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2814 (1992). 
149. Wechsler, supra note 12, at 19. 
150. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 8, at 23-28; BORK, supra note 22, at 143-60; RONALD 
DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 411 (1986) ("We should ... try to conceive our political community as 
an association of principle ... [because] that conception of community offers an attractive basis 
for claims of political legitimacy in a community of free and independent people who disagree 
about political morality and wisdom."); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 200 (1961). 
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interpretation establishes the core elements of its legitimacy. Most 
fundamentally, principles constrain the judicial decision so that the 
decision maker does not act as "a naked power organ."1111 The disci-
pline of locating and relying upon principles removes personal bias as 
much as possible from the decision-making process.1112 It also helps 
decision makers screen out other extraneous influences that may dic-
tate particular results but may not be consonant with enduring princi-
ples.1113 Articulated principles help harmonize decisions with each 
other. 1114 This harmony lends coherence and predictability to the law. 
These traits, in turn, help demonstrate the enduring, rather than the 
case specific, nature of the grounding of constitutional decisions.11111 In 
addition, the requirement that the decision maker provide such an ar-
ticulation actually may change the process, as the decision maker may 
discover that a certain desired result "simply 'won't write.' " 1118 The 
exercise of providing reasons thus may serve as an important con-
straint on the decision-making process.1117 
Principles support not only the substance but also the perception 
of legitimacy. By stating the principles upon which it relied, the deci-
sion maker demonstrates the substance.1118 The content of the princi-
ples offered should engender respect.1119 Moreover, the very act of pro-
viding them may engender respect as well by treating the losing 
litigants and the public at large as deserving of an explanation.18° Fi-
nally, the act of stating principles in judicial opinions facilitates com-
munication among constitutional decision makers.181 The apparent 
continuity of these principles can demonstrate an accumulated wis-
151. Wechsler, supra note 12, at 12. 
152. Kent Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 CoLUM. L. 
R EV. 982, 998 (1978) . 
153. In addition to purely personal preferences, judges may be influenced by interest 
groups, the values of their social or economic class, see BoRK, supra note 22, at 8; ELY, supra 
note 42, at 58-59; or perhaps by the impulse to bend over backwards so as not to act upon their 
personal preferences. 
154. Greenawalt, supra note 152, at 998. 
155. See, e.g., id. at 1000; Steven D. Smith, Idolatry in Constitutional Interpretation, 79 
VA. L. REv. 583, 619 ( 1993) ("[P]rinciples function to endow constitutional provisions with a 
wisdom that transcends that of either their flesh-and-blood authors or their mortal interpreters."); 
Wechsler, supra note 12, at 12 (criticizing " ad hoc evaluation"). 
156. FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE 57 (1980) ("The act of writing te11s US 
what was wrong with the act of thinking."); see J. Clark Kelso, A Report on the California 
Appellate System, 45 HASTINGS L. J . 433, 487 (1994) (" [W]riting an opinion . . . helps to ensure 
the . . . initial decision withstands the disciplined rigor of a written memorialization."). 
157. GOLDING, supra note 47, at 9 ("[R]easons ... operate as controls on the process of 
deliberation.") . 
158. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 365-72 
(1978); Levi, supra note 19, at 409. 
159. GoLDING, supra note 47, at 9 ("The reasons [which the Court offers in an opinion] 
will have to be regarded by [the audience] as good reasons for the decision."). 
160. /d. at 8 (" In making an effort at rational persuasion, judges show respect for their 
audience by addressing its members as rational individuals .. . . "). 
161. Greenawalt, supra note 152, at 998 ("[T]he technique of posing cases and suggesting 
principles orally and in draft opinions is a crucial method of communication among judges . . . . "). 
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dom, which in turn helps to show that the decision is independent of 
purely personal preferences and worthy of respect. 
Pursuant to this understanding, "[t]he virtue or demerit of a 
judgment turns ... entirely on the reasons that support it and their 
adequacy to maintain any choice of values it decrees .... " 162 The 
problem, however, with the use of such "neutral principles" as the 
sole determinant of constitutional interpretive legitimacy is that the 
neutrality upon which the validity of the principles depends is impossi-
ble to achieve.163 That is, principles do not dictate value choices. The 
actuality is vice versa.164 Thus "principles" cannot serve the ultimate 
justificatory function as traditionally envisioned.1611 
The question is whether principles can still serve some important 
function with respect to creating legitimacy even if they alone are not 
sufficient to sustain it. I think they can.166 That principles cannot pro-
vide ultimate justification does not mean that they can provide none at 
all. 167 A new understanding of legitimacy must be based upon real 
possibilities. Achieving some of the qualities that principles have been 
thought to provide is better than achieving none. That reliance upon 
principles to establish interpretive legitimacy may require supplemen-
tation does not mean that constitutional decision makers should aban-
don them altogether. 
One way in which the effort to rely on principles can still help 
constitutional decision makers is by screening out personal and other 
partisan biases. The discipline of finding and enunciating principles 
that transcend particular cases can make at least some constitutional 
meanings wildly implausible.168 
Thinking in terms of principles also can help decision makers to 
remember the goal of articulating constitutional meanings that not 
only stem from the past, but also will endure into the future. In turn, 
162. Wechsler, supra note 12, at 19-20. 
163. See, e.g. , Tushnet, supra note 36, at 822 ("[N]eutral principles theory proves unable 
to satisfy its demand for rule-guided judicial decisionmaking in a way that can constrain or define 
the judicial institution . . . . "). 
164. See. e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 103 ("Those who deny the existence of [moral 
decisions external to the Constitution] are without self-consciousness."); see also TAYLOR, supra 
note 21 , at 99 ("It is a form of self-delusion to think that we do not speak from a moral orienta-
tion which we take to be right."). 
165. See Levinson, supra note 5, at 401 (Such justification requires an "antecedent moral-
ity," which supplies a "common vocabulary in terms of which critics can argue with one another 
about how well this task [of constitutional interpretation] has been performed.") (quoting Richard 
Rorty, Nineteenth-Century Idealism and Twentieth-Century Textualism, in CONSEQUENCES OF 
PRAGMATISM 139 (1982)). 
166. I am not alone in this belief. See Greenawalt, supra note 152, at 1001 ("I do not 
believe any critic denies that at least one thing for which courts should strive is principled justifi-
cation . . . . "). ' 
167. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman & Brian Letter, Determinancy, Objectivity and Authority, 
142 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 589 (1993) ("Uniqueness .. . is not a requirement of legitimate 
authority."). 
168. See. e.g., Schauer, Easy Cases, supra note 13. 
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displaying the principles in the judicial opinion can move toward es-
tablishing that the constitutional decision-making process is substan-
tively legitimate. And, most basically, the act of trying to articulate 
principles for constitutional decision making is more likely to engen-
der respect than unexplained pronouncement.189 
Finally, we have, after all, grown accustomed to principled deci-
sion making as the mark of constitutional interpretive legitimacy. 
Even if principles are largely indeterminant, their invocation still 
seems to command some respect, which is an aspect of legitimacy. I 
say, let principles continue to work what magic they can.170 At the 
same time, we should begin constructing a foundation under the invo-
cation of principles, so that when they become obviously empty of jus-
tificatory power, something else supports the decision's legitimacy. In 
the remaining subparts, I discuss additional components of legitimacy 
that can supplement the invocation of principles. 
B. Articulacy 
A demonstrated reliance upon principles, as I have argued, can 
help establish the core elements of interpretive legitimacy both be-
cause these principles help constrain constitutional decision makers 
from writing their own preferences into the law and because they can 
engender public respect. Using principles in establishing constitutional 
interpretive legitimacy is of limited value, however, because they are 
often so general that they support a number of different constitutional 
meanings171 and thus may not truly explain the meaning that the 
Court has chosen. Although the Court in its explanations purports to 
use broad principles to derive specific meanings, the reality is vice 
versa: the broad principles which the Court articulates already con-
tain choices about more specific meanings that the Court fails to jus-
tify. Absent .an explanation that addresses the controversial choices 
made by the Cqurt, its chosen constitutional meanings · appear to be 
judicial fiat. 172 This appearance undercuts the Court's. interpretive le-
gitimacy. What is necessary, therefore, is an explanation t~af pre-
cedes principles and that can help demonstrate that the chosen consti-
tutional meaning differs from the decision makers' personal 
preferences and, thus, is worthy of respect. 
169.' ·See, e.g.; SUNSTE~N. supra notel4, at 126 ("[A]ny position about law and politics, to 
be worth holding, must be justified with reference to reasons."). 
170. See Smith, supra note 155, at 619-25 (describing the invocation of principles as a step 
in constitu tiona! idolatry). 
171. See, e.g., Schauer, Formalism, supra note 13, at 514; Tushnet, supra note 36, at 822 
(When following a "principle . .. we can justify a tremendous range of divergent answers by 
constructing the rule so that it generates the answer that we want.") . 
172. See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 36, at 704 (noting the problem where "Justices inevita-
bly seem to impose their perso.nal values on society"). 
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This phenomenon of unarticulated understandings in constitu-
tional adjudication represents, I believe, a more specific instance of 
the dilemma, apparent in public discussions generally, that people 
hold different moral commitments which they deem to be fundamen-
tal and from which they reason to judgments on particular issues.· 
These different underlying premises lead to different specific results. 
Our problem is that we have not found a way to mediate meaningfully 
among the basic prernises.173 Absent some sort ofjudgment and a jus-
tification for that judgment at the most basic level of discussion, justi-
fications offered further up the chain of logic are unconvincing. 
Take, for example, the raging public debate over whether the law 
should permit abortion: Views on this issue generally stem from judg-
ments about the relative value of fetal life and a woman's bodily au-
tonomy. These judgments may have religious, philosophical, prag-
matic, or other roots. Adherence to these judgments, however, is not a 
matter of logic, but a matter of faith or emotional embrace.174 Logic 
cannot mediate among these rival premises. Hence, efforts at justifica-
tion that define these nonlogical judgments as their starting points be-
gin their reasoning after points of view have already diverged. When 
the discussions begin at this level, rational reconciliation of the com-
peting positions seems only a faint possibility. 1711 
The Court's discussions of the constitutional protection of the 
abortion decision suffer the same fate. "At the heart [of the liberty 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment]," explains the, Casey joint 
opinion, "is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of 
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."176 This 
premise competes with the premise "that what the Court calls the 
fetus and what others call the unborn child is a human life."177 For 
those who subscribe to the latter premise, the constitutional meaning 
derived by logical reasoning from the former "is bound to be 
wrong." 178 Thus, those who do not agree with the former premise will 
remain unconvinced by a judicial opinion based upon it. 
These rival, and apparently incommensurable,179 premises that 
guide judicial and public argumentation are not, however, without 
173. See, e.g., MACINTYRE, supra note 84, at 253 ("[M]odern politics cannot be a matter 
·of genuine moral consensus."); Levinson, supra note 5, at 401 (disputing the view that "morality 
remains widely shared and available to reflection"). 
174. See, e.g., Susan H. Williams, Feminist Jurisprudence and Free Speech Theory, 68 
TuL. L. REv. 1563, 1569 (1994) (noting a link between emotion, value judgments, and choice). 
175. See MACINTYRE, supra note 84, at 6-11 (detailing rival positions on the morality of 
abortion and noting the incommensurability of their underlying premises) . 
176. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992) (plurality). 
177. !d. at 2875 (Scalia, J., dissenting) . 
178. !d. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
179. See MACINTYRE, supra note 84, at 8 (defining incommensurability as existing when 
"the rival premises are such that we possess no rational way of weighing the claims of one as 
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foundation. The Court has moved away from reliance upon founda-
tional sources of meaning because some more contingent sources of 
meaning guide them. Indeed, such contingent sources of meaning in-
form the competing premises from which adherents to different points 
of view on abortion reason. These sources are difficult, but not impos-
sible, to identify.180 Nor do these premises stand alone. Rather, each 
is connected to a moral vision that, in fact, establishes the existence of 
the premises. The premises themselves make sense only in light of this 
moral vision. That is, the moral vision more specifically explains the 
meaning of the premise and why the premise is worth affirming.181 
The vision thereby helps justify conclusions to which the premise 
leads. This type of articulacy about the sources and moral visions in-
forming constitutional decisions is the Court's best hope of justifying 
its authority when the principles upon which it ostensibly relies are 
hotly disputed. 
I adapt my meaning of articulacy in constitutional interpretation 
from Charles Taylor's recent philosophical discussion.182 Articulacy 
means putting the vision of the good that informs the particular judg-
ment into words.183 Such articulacy is necessary for the judgment to 
convey its meaning because "the good is what, in its articulation, gives 
the point of the rules which define the right."18" That is, we all "speak 
from a moral orientation which we take to be right."18& We, by and 
large, assume, however, the grounding for this moral orientation 
rather than state it directly. But, without articulating the sources of 
these moral orientations, we cannot examine, discuss or even affirm 
them. Thus, moral disagreements are in fact intractable because no 
discussion occurs at the point where the moral commitments diverge. 
Articulacy represents "the attempt to articulate the good" that in-
forms the moral principles that, in turn, lead to judgments on particu-
lar issues.186 
against another."); see also JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF fREEDOM 321-66 (1986) (also defin-
ing incommensurability). 
180. See, e.g., MACINTYRE, supra note 84, at 6-11 ( tracing various positions on the moral-
ity of abortion to ideas articulated by various philosophers). 
181. See TAYLOR. supra note 21, at 77. Taylor explains: 
It is one thing to say that I ought to refrain from manipulating your emotions or threatening 
you, because that is what respecting your rights as a human being requires. It is quite an· 
other to set out just what makes human beings worthy of commanding our respect, and to 
describe the higher mode of life and feeling which is involved in recognizing this. 
!d. 
182. See TAYLOR, supra note 21, at 53-107 (discussing the "ethics of inarticulacy" and 
"the point of articulacy about the good"). 
183. /d. at 103 (arguing for " the attempt to articulate the good in some kind of philosophi· 
cal prose") . 
184. /d. at 89. 
185. ld. at 99. 
186. /d. at 103. 
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Specifically, "articulating a vision of the good" differs from "of-
fering a basic reason"187 because reasons already contain assumptions 
about the good.188 Thus, discussions that start with reasons actually 
may begin after perspectives have diverged. Articulacy about "what 
underlies our ethical choices, leanings, intuitions"189 addresses the 
point of the divergence. It requires "setting out just what I have a dim 
grasp of when I see that A is right, or X is wrong, or Y is valuable 
and worth preserving, and the like. It is to articulate the moral point 
of our actions."190 Only at this leveP91 does the articulation have the 
possibility of being convincing, "either by articulating what underlies 
[the listener's] existing moral intuitions or perhaps by [the] descrip-
tion moving [the listener] to the point of making it [the listener's] 
own."I92 
Once we recognize that constitutional adjudication requires value 
judgments, I think that we need to see that this type of decision mak-
ing, like moral decision making generally, stems from a vision of the 
good. The threat to the legitimacy of constitutional interpretation thus 
stems from confusion similar to that which Taylor identifies as plagu-
ing modern philosophy, that proponents of rival interpretations keep 
their "most basic insights inarticulate. "193 This "inarticulacy" is a 
"crippling handicap to seeing clearly . . . in the very modern predica-
ment of perplexity and conflict between rival notions of the good."19' 
The Court's continued adherence to formalist assumptions in its por-
trayal of its constitutional decision-making process feeds this 
confusion. 
Only an effort at articulacy can rescue the Court from its predic-
ament. This requires an effort to identify, explain, and justify as ap-
propriate the sources of value judgments that inform the Court's con-
stitutional decisions and the visions of the good to which they lead. In 
Casey, for example, greater articulacy would require a discussion of 
why the joint opinion reaffirms a constitutional meaning that protects 
the right to terminate a pregnancy. In so doing, the joint opinion priv-
ileges a woman's autonomy over fetal life during the first part of a 
pregnancy. This judgment stems, in part, from a vision of the good 
187. /d. at 77. 
188. /d. Assumptions about the good " function as an orienting sense of what is important, 
valuable, or commanding which emerges in our pa rticula te intuit ions a bout how we should act, 
feel, respond on different occasions, and on which we dra w when we deliberate about ethical 
matters." /d. 
189. ld. 
190. /d. 
191. Taylor claims that articulacy about the good " isn' t a step to a more basic leva!, be-
cause there is no asymmetry." /d. I use this terminology, however, because I find it most descrip-
tive of what needs to be done-articulate what comes before the articulation of a reason. 
192. /d. 
193. /d. at 89. 
194. ld. at 98. 
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that requires this right. The Court needs to explain the value of pro-
viding this right. References to "liberty" and "bodily integrity" are 
not enough, as competing visions of these concepts are at stake. The 
Court needs to provide a vision of the good that explains its decision 
to narrow those terms in a particular way. 
This effort at articulacy, I believe, can address the primary com-
ponent of the threat to the Court's interpretive legitimacy, which is 
that controversial value judgments remain unacknowledged, unex-
plained and, thus, unconvincing. Of course, nothing guarantees that 
such articulacy about sources of values and visions of the good that 
lead to constitutional decisions ultimately will be convincing. Cer-
tainly it is unlikely to convince all listeners. The same, however, is 
true of the current method of making and presenting judicial deci-
sions-some people remain unconvinced. In very controversial cases in 
which mere pronouncements of values have become unconvincing, a 
deeper explanation of the source of the values at least creates the pos-
sibility of convincing those with apparently different perspectives on 
constitutional meaning. At a minimum, articulacy makes the visions 
of the good upon which the constitutional meanings depend available 
for affirmation or persuasion.m I think it quite likely that this in-
creased lucidity can lead to some degree of reconciliation of appar-
ently incommensurable perspectives.196 This reconciliation, in turn, 
could add legitimacy to the constitutional decision.197 
In addition, greater articulacy can enhance the legitimacy of the 
judgment, even as to those who remain unconvinced. Most basically, 
articulacy grants the legitimacy that comes from honesty, which is the 
legitimacy that comes from treating people with respect.198 Because 
articulacy represents not only honesty, but also effort, it could lend 
the additional legitimacy of respect that comes from observing a dili-
gent effort to work through a perplexing dilemma. Moreover, articu-
lacy, which requires a fuller explanation of value judgments, creates a 
greater possibility of explaining convincingly how the chosen values 
differ from the decision maker's personal preferences. This type of ex-
planation, too, may help legitimate the decision even for those who 
disagree with the result.199 Also, articulacy about the vision of the 
good that motivates the decision exposes this vision to ongoing critical 
review, thereby allowing those who disagree with the decision maker's 
195. See id. at 77. 
196. Like Taylor, I can offer this only as a "hunch." !d. at 106. 
197. See the discussion of the legitimacy that comes from converged perspectives infra part 
III.C. 
198. See Shapiro, supra note 145, at 736. 
199. See GOLDING, supra note 47, at 8 (explaining that the reasons that underlie a decision 
may legitimate it for those who disagree by demonstrating that the decision "was not made 
arbitrarily"). 
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articulation of those grounds to question them in the course of inter-
preting constitutional meaning.200 Articulacy's implicit assurance that 
this type of discussion can continue to occur may add to the legiti-
macy of the current result. 
Like the exercise of finding and stating principles for constitu-
tional decision making, articulacy alone cannot legitimate the Court's 
authority. In tandem, however, with the giving of principles, articu-
lacy can enhance the legitimacy of constitutional decision making. Ar-
ticulacy creates the possibility of explaining, and thereby potentially 
legitimating, what, despite the exercise of offering principles, most 
often now goes unacknowledged and thus unexplained. 
C. Augmenting Perspectives 
Articulacy supplements the act of giving principles for constitu-
tional decision making by adding depth to the explanation. It thus 
creates a greater possibility of explaining a constitutional decision in a 
way that appears independent of the decision maker's personal prefer-
ences and worthy of respect. But articulacy is not enough to demon-
strate the legitimacy of a constitutional decision because, as I have 
described it thus far, articulacy requires only explanation of the 
choice that the Court makes. Although mere explanation of the 
Court's choice provides some legitimacy, the mere description lacks 
substantitve legitimacy.201 A more complete legitimacy must thus con-
tain another component which can help guide the Court toward 
choices that are more likely to be something other than the decision 
maker's preferences and, because of this fact, worthy of public 
respect. 
This additional component of legitimacy is the demonstrated in-
terpersonal validity of the judgment that comes from augmenting per-
spectives in the decision-making process.202 I derive this additional 
component from the aspiration that formal legitimacy cannot 
achieve-a universally acknowledged foundation to underlie judicial 
reasoning. Of course, universally affirmed guides for decision making 
are not available. Nevertheless, as with the other components of legiti-
macy that I have discussed, I do not see why the inability to achieve 
legitimacy entirely through this vehicle dictates abandoning altogether 
the legitimacy that comes from shared recognitions. Although the as-
200. Articulacy thus builds elements of the deconstructive method into the decision-making 
process itself. See DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION (1991) (sug$esting this same 
possibility in the context of defining "women's interests"). 
201. See GOLDING, supra note 47, at 3-6 (distinguishing explanatory and justificatory 
reasons). 
202. See Heidi L. Feldman, Objectivity in Legal Judgment, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1187, 1223-
26 (1994) (noting that interpersonal validity is a component of objectivity). 
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piration toward universality appears unachievable, I see as attainable 
the more modest goal of identifying or forging partially shared under-
standings that can help legitimate judgments. Moreover, perhaps the 
aspiration for universality does not require unanimous agreement. The 
perception that a wide range of perspectives respectfully were in-
cluded in the decision-making process, and thereby had the opportu-
nity to influence the constitutional meaning that emerged, can also 
add to the judgment's legitimacy. 
Shared recognitions, I think, are crucial to support the legitimacy 
of a constitutional decision. Constitutional decisions, in fact, always 
have relied upon them.203 But this reliance, which has been largely 
implicit, now needs to become more overt. To enhance its legitimacy, 
the Court must consciously identify and portray in its opinions shared 
recognitions that can help support its constitutional meanings.204 
Identifying these shared meanings is best accomplished by an in-
teractive methodology,2011 which requires the Court to engage actively 
with different perspectives on constitutional meaning during the deci-
sion-making process. The Court should not choose a constitutional 
meaning by other means and then search for agreement. Instead, the 
Court should enter the decision-making process willing to listen to, 
203. See. e.g., SuNSTEJN, supra note 14, at 103. Sunstein notes: 
It is often true that a text has a plain meaning, or that there is no room for interpretive 
doubt. But when this is so, it is because there is no disagreement about the appropriate back-
ground principles. It is not because there is a preinterpretive 'fact' that people can uncover 
without resort to substantive principles. 
/d. 
204. See Feldman, supra note 202, at 1229, I 253 (noting that convergence on a judgment 
suggests its objectivity, which in turn is closely related to the issue of law's legitimacy). 
205. Others have called this methodology "dialogue." See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, LovE 
AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991) (calling for 
ecumenical political dialogue) ; Feldman, supra note 202, at 1223-26 (arguing that a dialogical 
methodology best promotes an achievable version of objectivity); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and 
Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577, 653-54 (1993) (arguing that judicial decisions are best 
described as the result of dialogue); Michelman, supra note 89, at 1502 (calling for the transfor-
mation of constitutional adjudication into a "jurisgenerative dialogue"). Jtirgen Habermas is an 
important source of the idea of dialogue as the methodology for legitimate decision making. See 
JORGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1975); JORGEN HABERMAS, 
MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (1990); JORGEN HABERMAS, THE PHILO-
SOPHlCAL DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY (1987) (hereinafter HABERMAS, PHILOSOPHICAL DIS-
COURSE) ; I JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Thomas McCarthy 
trans., 1984) (hereinafter I HABERMAS, COMMUNICATIVE ACTION}. Legitimate decision making, 
according to Habermas, should be a conversation among "free and equal members in a coopera-
tive search for truth," Jtirgen Habermas, Justice and Solidarity: On the Discussion Concerning 
"Stage 6", in THE MORAL DOMAIN: EssAYS ON THE ONGOING DISCUSSION BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY 
AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 235 (Thomas E. Wren ed., 1990), and all those whom a judgment 
affects should consent to it, Jtirgen Habermas, Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philo-
sophical Justification, in MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra, at 157. 
My problem with the terminology stems from my problem with Habermas's theory-both re-
present an ideal that is so far from what the Court is likely to achieve in the foreseeable future 
that I hesitate to use them. By "interactive methodology" I mean to pare down the ideal to re-
present a conversation where the inclusion and the elimination of power discrepancies is necessa-
rily incomplete. 
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and perhaps be persuaded by, different perspectives on constitutional 
meaning. 206 
How can the Court find these different perspectives on constitu-
tional meaning? Of course, it is impossible, as a practical matter, to 
involve the entire public in constitutional decision making. But the 
legitimacy that comes from augmenting perspectives need not occur 
immediately or be achieved completely to enhance the legitimacy of 
the result. The current amicus brief practice provides a vehicle for 
starting down the road toward greater participation of previously ex-
cluded perspectives in ascertaining the values that underlie constitu-
tional decision making. At this time, the Court infrequently, or at 
least erratically, reads or considers these briefs. If the Court were to 
consider seriously the perspectives which amicus briefs present, the 
level of participation could change, thus potentially presenting a wider 
range of perspectives that, if considered and understood, could en-
hance the intersubjectivity of the result. 
Articulacy and an interactive methodology can work together to 
make each richer and more complex. Articulacy requires an effort to 
put into words the moral vision that underlies particular constitutional 
meanings. The combined aspirations toward articulacy and an inter-
active methodology lead to the aspiration that the Court listen to and 
compare different perspectives on constitutional meaning in light of 
the visions of the good that they represent. 
This complex evaluation of perspectives would enhance the legiti-
macy of constitutional interpretation in a number of ways. Consider-
ing more perspectives in greater depth enhances the possibility of rec-
ognizing previously unnoticed commonalities among perspectives. The 
demonstrated convergence of perspectives on the constitutional mean-
ing can help demonstrate the core aspects of legitimacy- that the re-
sult is based on convergence rather than personal preference and, in 
part because of the convergence, is worthy of respect. 
In addition to adding the weight of common perspectives to the 
result, other reasons to search for previously unrecognized connections 
among perspectives can add to legitimacy.207 One reason is that recog-
nizing connections makes it more likely that participants will find 
common ground. Participants may disagree as to the ultimate result, 
but agree at various points along the articulacy chain. Articulating 
these points of agreement joins the participants, perhaps making their 
206. See Bartlett, supra note 143, at 881 (A valid decision requires tbat the decision maker 
make an " effort to extend [its]limited perspective" by attempting to " identify and understand the 
perspectives of others."). 
207. On the value of participation in decision making, apart from its results, see HANNAH 
ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 22-38 (1958); BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: 
PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 150-55 (1984); PERRY, supra note 205, a t 122-27; 
WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN. RECONSTRUCTING PUBLIC PHJLOSOPHY 155-70 ( 1980). 
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points of disagreement less acrimonious.208 Another reason to seek va-
rious levels of connection among perspectives is that, after ascertain-
ing an underlying moral connection at a general level, the decision 
maker must justify a divergence in points of view at a specific level. 
Sometimes the divergence will depend upon ascertainable facts that 
can dissolve the disagreement. 
"Even when we understand them, [however,] some voices will 
lose. "209 This is the inevitability of constitutional decision mak-
ing-the Court must choose among contested meanings. The "aug-
menting perspectives" aspect of legitimacy does not dictate how the 
Court should do the choosing. Specifically, the requirement that the 
Court augment its own perspectives does not dictate that it choose the 
majority point of view, or any particular point of view. Rather, the 
process should add legitimacy to the result, whatever it may be. An 
important aspect of legitimacy is that even the losers respect the judg-
ment, or at least respect the Court's constitutional decision-making 
process.210 The Court's interaction with competing perspectives in the 
decision-making process can help create this aspect of legitimacy. 
Most fundamentally, legitimacy comes from the honest recogni-
tion of difference rather than a subterfuge. As to the public perception 
of the decision, "lack of candor seldom goes undetected for long, and 
its detection only serves to increase the level of cynicism about the 
nature of judging and judges."211 Honesty about the fact that the 
Court can render a constitutional decision in light of differing valid 
perspectives on constitutional meaning treats the public as "capable of 
dealing with the truth"212 that value judgments must be made. Those 
whose perspectives the decision does not adopt receive the independent 
value of being listened to and understood. Honesty as to why the 
Court did not adopt their perspective treats them also as capable of 
understanding that choices must be made and their perspectives, at 
208. Obviously, decreased acrimony will not always be the result of increased articulacy. 
Some perspectives contain as their premises intolerance of other points of view. See. e.g., Linda J. 
Lacey, Mimicking the Words, But Missing the Message: The Misuse of Cultural Feminist 
Themes in Religion and Family Law Jurisprudence, 35 B.C. L. REv. 1, 16 (1993) (noting that a 
number of the "absolutely held beliefs" of religious fundamentalists "are deeply sexist, racist, and 
homophobic") (citation omitted). As to the incompatibility of such views with an interactive 
methodology, see Daniel 0. Conckle, Religious Purpose, Inerrancy, and the Establishment 
Clause, 67 IND. L.J. I (1991); David M. Smolin, Regulating Religious and Cultural Conflict in a 
Postmodern America: A Response to Professor Perry, 76 IowA L. REv. 1067 (1991). 
209. Minow, supra note 143, at 92 (citation omitted); see also MARTHA C. NuSSBAUM, THE 
FRAGILITY OF THE Gooo 32-47 {1986); J.M. Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction. Transcen-
dent Justice, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1131, 1167 {1994) ("We have some duty to speak in the language 
of the Other, but our duty is not infinite . ... [l)t is not only appropriate but necessary for us to 
recognize that the Other's views are incoherent or unjustified, and that our own position is more 
reasonable.") . 
210. See, e.g., PHILIP SOPER, A THEORY OF LAW (1984). 
211. Shapiro, supra note 145, at 737. 
212. /d. 
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least this time, were not chosen. Moreover, clarity about the reason 
for rejecting the perspective allows these participants to evaluate the 
reason and to focus current and future critical review. In addition, 
acknowledging that perspectives other than the one chosen can exist 
preserves them as a part of the decision-making process in a way that 
rejecting them as faulty or not acknowledging them at all does not. 
This acknowledgment puts and keeps the perspective in public view 
even though it is not chosen, thereby leaving the perspective available 
for current and continuing critical review. 
Some may argue that such candor in rejecting perspectives dam-
ages rather than enhances the legitimacy of the result, because the 
explicitness of the explanation may be more hurtful or insulting than 
an acknowledged, implicit rejection. This assumption, however, may 
minimize the extent to which the implicit rejections are felt already as 
hurtful and insulting. The assumption depends to a great extent upon 
the ideas that the holders of the rejected perspective do not perceive 
the rejections or, perhaps, that they are less likely to blame the deci-
sion maker for rejecting their perspective when the decision maker 
appears not to recognize what it is doing. Both of these ideas, in turn, 
depend upon the illusion that the Court either is not rejecting valid 
perspectives on constitutional meaning or does not know that it is do-
ing so. As I have demonstrated, at least in highly controversial cases, 
the illusion no longer works. In this type of situation, the illusion does 
not legitimate a stance that fails to acknowledge and explain the 
choice of perspective and such a stance loses legitimacy because of its 
apparent lack of candor or understanding. Although highly controver-
sial cases clearly generate strong feelings, it is much less clear that a 
strategy of submerging, rather than addressing honestly, those differ-
ences enhances the legitimacy of the necessary choice. 
In short, a conscious effort to augment perspectives in the deci-
sion-making process can go some of the way toward establishing an 
authoritative grounding for constitutional decisions. Although the 
Court cannot possibly include all perspectives on constitutional mean-
ing in the decision-making process, it can include some. The efforts 
the Court makes toward inclusion will enhance its interpretive legiti-
macy to that extent. I would be satisfied if the Court would start by 
simply addressing respectfully and with an effort toward articulacy 
the perspectives embodied in the various concurring and dissenting 
opinions offered in any one case. Then, the Court could expand its 
discussion to consider perspectives offered in amicus briefs. Finally, in 
some cases, the Court might, in fact, request that those with various 
perspectives participate in the decision-making process. Any of these 
efforts would add to the legitimacy of the constitutional result. 
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D. Honesty 
All of the components of legitimacy that I have discussed depend 
most basically upon judicial honesty. One might think that the pro-
position that constitutional decision makers should not deceive their 
audiences would need little defense, 213 but apparently it does. 214 
Moreover, my idea of judicial honesty goes beyond what critics have 
typically identified as the "problem of candor" in judicial decision 
making.:m The honesty that I believe is necessary to establish the le-
gitimacy of constitutional decision making indeed requires decision 
makers "to search out and disclose the 'deepest' explanation of [their] 
actions. " 216 It requires discipline and effort, 217 and represents a 
change in how the Court quite obviously views its judicial function.218 
I thus offer a defense of candor in constitutional decision making and 
in the portrayal of the decision-making process in the judicial opinion. 
In light of the fact that constitutional decision makers must make 
controversial value judgments, candor in constitutional decision mak-
ing means a number of things. Most fundamentally, candor requires 
that the decision maker acknowledge the inevitable value judgments 
as such. This acknowledgement leads to the additional acknowledge-
ment that, with value choices, no basis for declaring one choice cor-
rect and the other incorrect is universally recognized. Thus, honesty 
involves the additional acknowledgement that multiple valid perspec-
tives on constitutional meaning may exist. Because of this possibility, 
candor requires the decision maker to acknowledge the partiality of its 
own perspective. Further, because of the necessary constraints on the 
decision maker's ability to augment its narrow perspective, honesty 
requires the decision maker to recognize the necessarily limited nature 
213. See Altman, supra note 76, at 296-97 (describing it as a "consensus position" within 
the legal academy that judges "should become aware of and disclose the real reasons for their 
decisions"); Shapiro, supra note 145, at 738 ("[W]ho, after all, would be Grinch-like enough to 
argue for lack of [judicial] candor?"). 
214. See Altman, supra note 76, at 299 (suggesting that "encouraging judges to understand 
their decision process better, if effective at all, could be harmful, would probably not succeed, and 
even if successful might not be worth doing"); Shapiro, supra note 145, at 739 (noting that "the 
literature" contains "many eloquent statements of the need for some form of selective deception, 
or at least nondisclosure, in the plying of the judge's trade"). 
215. See Shapiro, supra note 145, at 736 ("[T]he problem of candor ... arises only when 
the individual judge writes or supports a statement he does not believe to be so."). 
216. /d. at 738 n.33. 
217. See. e.g., Paul Brest, Constitutional Citizenship, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 175, 188 (1986) 
("Considering issues from the moral point of view requires habits and attitudes that come from 
regular practice."); cf Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind But Now I See": White Race Consciousness 
and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953, 957 (1993) ("We can work 
to make explicit the unacknowledged whiteness of facially neutral criteria of decision .... "). 
218. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming 
Moral Convictions into Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501, 1536 (1989) (book review) ("[J]udicial decision-
making contains very little serious deliberation on moral issues." (citation omitted)); Robin West, 
Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641, 715 ( 1990) 
("[A]djudication is profoundly elitist, hierarchic, and nonparticipatory."). 
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of the ultimate decision. It may be the best decision possible, but it is 
not perfect. Thus, honesty requires conforming the presentation of the 
decision with what the decision can possibly achieve. 
The honesty I advocate would enhance the legitimacy of constitu-
tional decision making in numerous ways. Most fundamentally, ac-
knowledging the value judgments that must occur in constitutional de-
cision making establishes symmetry between the nature of the 
decision and its presentation and thereby removes the contradiction 
that currently undermines the Court's interpretive legitimacy. Specifi-
cally, a Court that is honest about what it is doing in the interpretive 
process no longer exposes itself to claims that it is naive or deceptive. 
Such honesty also transforms the judicial opinion from a strategic to a 
genuinely communicative act.219 Opinions framed as strategic action 
can be expected to evoke similar strategic responses from the public 
audience. By contrast, communicative actions treat the recipients as 
worthy of respect, rather than as objects to be manipulated.230 Legiti-
macy, which comes from respect for the decision maker and the deci-
sion-making process, would seem to require this type of honesty as a 
basic prerequisite. 
Moreover, in contrast to a formal mode of presentation, attempt-
ing through articulacy to examine and explain the value judgments 
creates the possibility of legitimating the choice as independent of 
personal preferences and worthy of respect. Acknowledging that con-
stitutional decision making requires value choices and exercising ar-
ticulacy also exposes interpretive methods, such as originalism, which 
often presume sources of meaning to be foundational, to require artic-
ulate justification as well.221 Honesty about the nature of the constitu-
tional decision-making process puts all interpretive choices on the 
same footing-requiring a demonstration that they meet the demands 
of legitimacy.222 
219. Jilrgen Habermas makes this distinction in creating his theoretical model of discourse 
ethics. See I HABERMAS, COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 205, at 340-43. He first distin-
guishes two realms of human activity- <me geared toward truth seeking and understanding and 
the other geared toward efficient economic production and interaction. He then distinguishes what 
he calls strategic action from communicative action. Communicative action is oriented toward 
understanding, whereas strategic action is meant to obtain the goals of the speaker through means 
other than understanding, including dishonesty and manipulation. HABERMAS, PHILOSOPHICAL 
DISCOURSE, supra note 205, at 355. Only communicative action can be the basis for a legitimate 
decision, for otherwise the decision will be the result of the exercise of power rather than mutual 
understanding and agreement. 
220. See HABERMAS, PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE, supra note 205, at 355; see also Shapiro, 
supra note 145, at 736 ("[T]he case for honesty in all human relations .. . rests in part on the 
importance of treating others with respect.") . 
221. See, e.g. , SuNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 101 ("[The underpinnings of originalism] need 
to be defended . .. [and) would have to be based on something other than history."). 
222. See, e.g. , DwoRKIN, supra note 150, at 260 (acknowledging that there are no "politi-
cally neutral interpretive convictions") ; PERRY, supra note 205, at 132 ("Whether to pursue a 
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Another aspect of honesty in judicial opinion writing is acknowl-
edging the necessary limitations of any judgment reached.223 Consti-
tutional decision makers are human, and they have limited capacities 
to meet the demands of legitimacy.:m Decision makers may attempt 
to expose and examine the sources of their value judgments, but this 
task is potentially endless, and ultimately requires a transcendence of 
individuality that probably is not achievable.226 Decision makers also 
can attempt to portray their decision-making process and its result in 
a way that the public will deem worthy of respect. As we know, 
though, it is impossible to please everyone. Thus, respect, like inde-
pendence of personal preferences, must come in degrees. 
Given these recognitions, judicial honesty includes the additional 
recognition of the imperfect nature of legitimacy itself. Decision mak-
ers can only try to make the best choices under the circumstances that 
currently exist. This is not to say that constitutional decision makers 
should not strive to articulate enduring constitutional meanings. 
Rather, their efforts to do so will be limited by their situations. Hon-
esty in a judicial opinion requires that the decision maker acknowl-
edge this. By doing so, the decision maker limits the definition of le-
gitimacy toward which it strives. Because the definition is more 
limited, it is more achievable. Thus, by acknowledging the necessary 
partiality of any chosen constitutional meaning, the Court in fact can 
enhance, rather than reduce, the legitimacy of its result. 
Honesty, as embodied in all of the components of legitimacy that 
I have discussed, also adds to the legitimacy of a decision by opening 
it to ongoing critical review. This greater openness effectively allows 
those who ultimately embrace the substance in part or in whole as 
their own to do so.226 Unlike a decision that is unclear about its 
sources of meaning, and thus relies for its legitimacy solely on the 
articulation of its result, a decision that honestly attempts to portray 
its own sources both deeply and as emerging from the interaction of 
different perspectives on constitutional meaning creates the possibility 
of wider public affirmation. For those who continue to disagree with 
the choices made in the constitutional decision, its openness neverthe-
coercive political strategy is a (political-) moral question, of course, and any list of criteria for 
answering that question is rooted in a set of moral beliefs."). 
223. See. e.g. , Catherine Wells, Situated Decisionmaking, 63 S CAL. L. REv. 1727, 1746 
(1990) ("The recognition that legal judgments are situated is the first step towards an authentic 
ideal of fairness."). 
224. See. e.g., Bartlett, supra note 143, at 881 ("Truth is partial in that the individual 
perspectives that yield and judge truth are necessarily incomplete."). 
225. See THOMAS NAGEL. THE VIEW fROM NOWHERE 6 (1985) ("(S]ince we are who we 
are, we can' t get outside of ourselves completely."); Bartlett, supra note 143, at 882 ("I cannot 
transcend my perspective; by definition, whatever perspective I currently have limits my view."). 
226. See TAYLOR, supra note 21 , at 91 ("[G]oods . . . only exist for us through some 
articulation."). 
No. 2] RECREATING LEGITIMACY 399 
less provides the promise of ongoing critical review of the result and 
its sources. 
I know that incorporating this level of honesty in constitutional 
opinion writing is risky.227 Scholars have made various arguments in 
support of judicial ignorance228 and benevolent judicial deception.229 
These arguments all generally reduce to the claim that the Court, or 
the public, are better off not knowing exactly how the Court reaches 
its decision because otherwise the public will lose respect for the pro-
cess and the Court's decisions will lose legitimacy.230 
These arguments, however, depend upon the success of the decep-
tion.231 My discussion of the several examples in part I indicates that 
the Justices' opinions in single cases, when read together, dispel the 
illusion upon which the legitimacy of any one of them depends. At 
least in these very difficult cases where it is quite obvious that value 
judgments are being made, the formalist illusion fails. 232 In these cir-
cumstances, lack of candor not only does not enhance the perceived 
legitimacy of the decision, but when it is detected, breeds cynicism 
rather than respect.283 
Because the success of the illusion of formal legitimacy may vary 
from case to case, the Court could perhaps experiment in its most 
controversial cases with the components of legitimacy that I propose 
because, in these cases where the formalist assumption is most unten-
able, the Court has the least to lose. If, as I believe, displaying these 
components in the judicial opinion leads to increased respect for the 
process and its results, then the Court could adopt the method on a 
227. See MARTIN M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT 27 (1964) ("It 
would be fantastic indeed if the Supreme Court, in the name of sound scholarship, were to disa-
vow publicly the myth upon which its power rests."); Altman, supra note 76 (arguing that intro-
spective judicial decision making could lead to less constrained, and therefore less legitimate, deci-
sion making); Michael D. Daneker, Moral Reasoning and the Quest for Legitimacy, 43 AM. U. L. 
REv. 49, 53 (1993) (Judicial opinions that employ Lawrence Kohlberg's stage-four "law and or-
der" legal reasoning "may confer greater legitimacy on the act of judicial decision making than 
other types of moral reasoning" because lawyers are accustomed to it.); see also TAYLOR, supra 
note 21, at 107 (noting the risk that "articulacy will buy us much greater inner conflict"). 
228. See Altman, supra note 76. 
229. See Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Rules, 142 U. PA. L. 
REv. 1191, 1193 (1994) (arguing for a system of "esoteric government, in which the governed are 
not fully aware of the nature of the system that governs them") ; Shapiro, supra note 145, at 738-
50 (addressing five instances in which scholars have argued that judges should not be completely 
honest about their decision-making process). 
230. See fRANK, supra note 20, at 157 ("[F]ear of legal uncertainty leads to [judicial] 
concealment."). 
231. See THURMAN ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 237 ( 1935) ("Folklore which 
is frankly recognized by a people to be folklore is from that moment on no longer folklore."). 
232. I happen to think that the deception is obvious not only to those of vs in the scholarly 
heights, but also to the public more generally. It is for this reason that I take issue with academic 
invocations to judicial deception. See, e.g., Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 229. I think a large 
portion of the public sees through judicial efforts to deceive, which makes the benevolence of the 
deception insulting. 
233. Shapiro, supra note 145, at 737; see also fRANK, supra note 20, at 157 ("[Judicial] 
concealment has ... made the labor of judges less effective."). 
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wider scale. The whole premise of components of legitimacy, rather 
than one complete vision, means that legitimacy comes in increments. 
It is entirely possible, therefore, to attempt to achieve these compo-
nents in degrees instead of in one fell swoop. 
The fact that the components of legitimacy can be effective even 
if implemented incrementally addresses another criticism of hon-
esty-that the components of legitimacy require a Herculean judicial 
effort, impossible for constitutional decision makers actually to 
achieve. 234 But this criticism appears more devastating to the ideal of 
formal legitimacy which judicial opinion writing currently embodies 
rather than to the components of legitimacy previously discussed. As I 
view it, the ideal of formal legitimacy is all or nothing. Either sources 
are foundational or they are not. If they are not, then the chain of 
formal judicial reasoning loses its legitimacy. 
By contrast, my components of legitimacy help build a grounding 
for the constitutional decision that can give it legitimacy. Any judicial 
effort toward achieving these components thus adds some legitimacy. 
The components' incremental character makes it possible to weigh the 
value of achieving each component fully against other values, such as 
efficiency or even, in particular cases, the value of deception.u11 The 
components are flexible, and, therefore, can bend to accommodate the 
real life demands of constitutional adjudication. My point is simply 
that, all other things being equal, they can add a legitimacy to consti-
tutional decision making that the assumption of formal legitimacy 
cannot. The type of honesty that my components demand in judicial 
decision making thus represents an appropriate aspiration. 
IV. THE METHOD OF ARTICULATE DECISION MAKING 
Part II established the components of a legitimacy that can re-
place the assumptions of formalism apparent in the Court's constitu-
tional decisions. In this part, I combine these components into a 
method called articulate decision making. Articulate decision making 
would enhance both the substance and the perception of the Court's 
constitutional interpretive legitimacy. As to substance, the explicit 
method would guide and impose a discipline on the decision-making 
process that would make it more likely that the constitutional mean-
ing would have interpersonal validity and otherwise be worthy of re-
spect. As to perception, the revised substance would allow the Court 
234. See, e.g., DwORKIN, supra note 150, at 245 (naming his hypothetical decision maker 
Hercules and noting that to accomplish the ideal he would need to have "superhuman talents and 
endless time"). 
235. See Shapiro, supra note 145, at 750 (limiting his defense of judicial candor to account 
for "extraordinary occasions" when moral imperatives outweigh the value of truthfulness). 
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to replace its aspirations to formalism with an explanation of its deci-
sion making more likely to demonstrate these crucial aspects of 
legitimacy. 
The articulate decision-making process consists of several stages 
that necessarily interact. For clarity I will first discuss each of the 
steps and then discuss their potential interaction. 
A. The Substance of Articulate Decision Making 
The decision-making step of the articulate decision-making pro-
cedure involves two stages, one nonevaluative and the other evalua-
tive. It is crucial that the decision maker observe the discipline of both 
of these stages because the legitimacy of the second builds upon, and 
thus to a great extent depends upon, the success of the first. 
1. Nonevaluative Listening 
The first step in the articulate decision-making process is the de-
cision maker's true listening to the available perspectives on constitu-
tional meaning. Initially, this step requires that the decision maker 
acknowledge all of the perspectives before it as valid as perspec-
tives.236 The decision maker must go through the mental exercise of 
acknowledging that the observers' different situations may make the 
issue to be decided appear differently to different people. In the pro-
cess of doing this, the decision maker must also acknowledge the par-
tiality of its own perspective. The effort at this stage must be, to the 
greatest extent possible, to try to understand which different situations 
led to the different points of view.237 The understanding sought should 
be both logical and emotional.238 The greater the level of understand-
ing, the greater the legitimacy of the ultimate evaluation as indepen-
dent of the decision maker's purely personal preferences.239 
236. The feminist practice of consciousness raising employs similar assumptions. See Bart-
lett, supra note 143, at 863-67. 
237. Minow, supra note 143, at 57 ("Before justice can be done, judges need to hear and 
understand contrasting points of view."). 
238. PERRY, supra note 205, at 98 ("[D]ialogue can be a process through which hearts as 
well as minds are changed."); Posner, supra note 2, at 851 ("The proper conception [of interpre-
tation] is knowledge by empathy."). 
239. Although it may appear distasteful to acknowledge all proffered perspectives as valid 
at any stage in the decision-making process, nothing short of this discipline can ensure that worthy 
perspectives are not dismissed without explanation. The decision maker's ackn9wledgement of dif-
ferent perspectives on constitutional meaning and explanation of why some are chosen and some 
are not is a crucial aspect of the legitimacy of the evaluation stage. To the extent that some 
perspectives are widely viewed as unacceptable, this can serve as the explanation for rejecting 
them as appropriate for guiding constitutional decision making. The honesty requirement of artic-
ulate decision making demands, however, that they at least be acknowledged and their rejection 
explained. 
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At a minimum, the Court should read and consider honestly both 
the briefs presented to it in any particular case and the perspectives 
set forth in concurring and dissenting opinions. To achieve the fullest 
possible understanding of the different perspectives on constitutional 
meaning presented in a case, the Court should consider not only the 
range of different perspectives offered, but also each perspective in 
terms of the moral vision that informs it. Thus, when considering ap-
parently conflicting perspectives on constitutional meaning, the deci-
sion maker should attempt to understand what causes the difference, 
whether it be a divergence in a foundational vision of the good or 
some later divergence. 
In County of Allegheny, for example, the Court had before it the 
briefs of the parties and seven amicus briefs. In addition, the opinion 
set forth a number of other perspectives offered by the Justices them-
selves. An articulate decision in the case would require that the Court 
consider all of these perspectives, not only as to result,240 but also as 
to underlying moral vision. Because the amicus briefs generally follow 
the formal pattern of the Court's opinions, the task of considering the 
perspectives in depth would not be easy. The form of the amicus 
briefs, however, corresponds to the perception of what constitutes ef-
fective advocacy, and a change in the Court's decision-making process 
could change both this perception and, consequently, the form of the 
briefs. As the method of articulate decision making develops, it would 
need to make the participants in the constitutional decision-making 
process responsible for presenting their positions according to the re-
quirements of articulacy.241 
In any event, to the extent that the decision maker can trace the 
path of other perspectives, this exercise will help the decision maker 
understand the particular circumstances that contributed to the per-
spective, and will give the decision maker insight as to whether the 
circumstances should be relevant to public constitutional decision 
making. In a case like County of Allegheny, the Court could at least 
try to make this effort. Clues to the moral visions that inform these 
positions exist.242 This process of attempting to fully understand the 
240. Five of the amicus briefs urged reversal and two urged affirmance. See County of 
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 578 n. + (1989) (plurality opinion). 
241. See supra part III.C. 
242. These clues are best found in the preface to each brief, where the party states its 
interest in the case, perhaps because this is where the parties feel most free to openly acknowledge 
their own points of view. After this statement, the briefs by and large present formal arguments 
that history and Supreme Court precedent dictate their chosen result. See. e.g., Amicus Curiae 
Brief of Concerned Women for America in Support of Petitioners at I, County of Allegheny v. 
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (No. 87-2050) ("The purpose of CWA is to preserve, protect and 
promote traditional and Judeo-Christian values .. . . ") ; Amicus Curiae Brief of the National 
Legal Foundation, In Support of Petitioners at I, County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 
( 1989) (No. 87-2050) (If the displays are prohibited, "a pall of secularism that denies history will 
descend upon all of American public life.") . 
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various proffered perspectives and the reasons for their differences is 
crucial to the next step in articulate decision making, the critical ex-
amination by the decision makers of the diverse perspectives on the 
issue in order to reach a decision. 
2. Evaluating 
The very nature of making a decision is that, at some point, the 
process must become evaluative. The nonevaluative stage of the artic-
ulate decision-making process adds the legitimacy of inclusion to the 
decision-making process. The evaluative process, however, must to 
some extent exclude perspectives. Moreover, a universally acknowl-
edged normative ground for choosing among different perspectives 
does not exist. At this stage, articulate decision making enhances le-
gitimacy by clarifying the manner of excluding perspectives and, 
where appropriate, preserving perspectives as valid instead of rejecting 
them as invalid. 
A decision maker might choose one perspective on constitutional 
meaning over others for a number of reasons. A crucial variable is 
whether the decision maker rejected the perspective because the deci-
sion maker deemed it wrong or for some other reason. Articulate deci-
sion making requires the decision maker to acknowledge which fork in 
this decision-making process it travels, and a sufficient explanation for 
the decision would vary according to the path chosen. 
On the one hand, a decision maker may reject a perspective as 
invalid. If so, it would need to acknowledge this fact and explain why 
the perceptions are faulty. These explanations would relate to the na-
ture of perceiving-the participant does not have all the information, 
does not know her own interests, has been unable to critically assimi-
late different perspectives in evaluating her own, or the values embod-
ied in the perspective are so abhorrent to the community that the de-
cision maker is willing to declare them untrue.243 Whatever the 
particular reason, the decision maker must acknowledge the fact that 
it is declaring a perspective to be wrong and, thus, must take responsi-
bility for proclaiming one perspective more true. 
This requirement would likely limit the number of times that a 
decision maker rejects perspectives as invalid by making the act of 
doing so more deliberate. By limiting the extent to which a decision 
maker rejects a perspective as invalid, articulate decision making 
243. This addresses, for example, the concern that some extremely intolerant perspectives 
should not be treated as potentially valid by constitutional decision makers. Articulate decision 
making allows for this possibility. It simply requires that the decision maker acknowledge that it is 
rejecting a perspective and clearly state why. 
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gains legitimacy by preserving more perspectives as potentially valid 
even after the ultimate decision is reached. 
Even for those whose perspectives are declared invalid, articulate 
decision making has greater legitimacy than the current method of 
rejecting perspectives on constitutional meaning without explanation, 
because these participants would at least receive an explanation as to 
why the decision maker declared their perspectives wrong. The act of 
giving a candid explanation accords the participants a degree of re-
spect lacking in the current practice of ignoring or dismissing alter-
nate points of view. Moreover, the explanation of why the decision 
maker rejected a perspective acknowledges the fact of rejection, and 
thereby exposes that fact and the explanation to critical review. The 
legitimacy of the Court's decision to reject a· perspective as invalid 
comes both from its honesty in doing so and from the public percep-
tion that the rejection is worthy of respect. The latter sometimes may 
not be accurate, but even if the rejection of the perspective is per-
ceived as wrong, it may be perceived as legitimate nevertheless be-
cause the candor of the opinion opens the decision-making process to 
ongoing critical review. 
As an example here, the opinions of the Justices in County of 
Allegheny suffice to make the point. Each opinion declares at least 
one other opinion wrong.24• But does the dispute among the Justices 
in County of Allegheny actually relate to the nature of perceiving? 
Arguably, the Justices on either side have not been able to assimilate 
critically different perspectives in evaluating their own. Justice Black-
mun's opinion for the Court does not display a sensitive recognition of 
the impact of prohibiting public displays of traditional religious sym-
bols on those to whom the displays are deeply meaningful. Nor does 
Justice Kennedy's opinion evidence a recognition of the significance of 
feelings of exclusion on those who view public displays of religious 
symbols that are not their own. An adequate explanation for rejecting 
either of these opinions as wrong would require acknowledging the 
reason for this rejection, and, once acknowledged, would require the 
one rejecting the other to demonstrate that his opinion does not suffer 
from the same defect. A failure to do so would expose the result to 
criticism once issued. This criticism could, in turn, hasten reconsidera-
tion of the result. Because I think it would be difficult for the Justices 
in County of Allegheny to make such a demonstration, the more prob-
able result of this explicit requirement of explanation is that the opin-
ions would acknowledge that they cannot reject the other perspective 
244. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 612 (1989) (Biackmun, J.) (stating 
that the Court's decision is "incontrovertible"); id. at 668 n.6 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (marveling at the depth of the Court's error) . 
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as wrong. They would have to accept other perspectives as valid as 
perspectives. 
If a decision accepts a number of perspectives as valid as perspec-
tives, it nevertheless must choose among them to the extent that they 
conflict as to a substantive result. In this type of case, the decision 
maker would need to explain in terms other than the nature of per-
ceiving why the decision maker prefers one perspective on constitu-
tional meaning over another. To be convincing (that is, to truly give 
reasons) in a hard case, the explanation would have to be tied to the 
moral vision that informs it. Further, the decision maker's reasons for 
the choice would have to justify sufficiently the result in light of con-
flicting, but potentially valid, perspectives. Thinking through this pro-
cess should improve the critical worth of the decision by encouraging 
the decision maker to be honest initially about its assumptions and 
perspectives. 
Requiring articulacy in explaining the basis of a constitutional 
decision makes the process of evaluating different perspectives on con-
stitutional meaning more complex, but also potentially more fruitful. 
Ideally, in the evaluation process the decision maker should listen to 
and compare perspectives both as to specific result and underlying 
moral vision. This creates the possibility of many different meshings 
and conflicts among perspectives. Perspectives may differ as to there-
sult in a particular case but agree as to the sources of constitutional 
principles, or vice versa, or they may agree and clash at several points 
along the line from the moral sources to the more particular result. 
An articulate decision maker ideally would evaluate its choices from 
the specific decision down to the underlying sources of constitutional 
meaning. 
For example, the Court's evaluation process in cases that, like 
Casey, involve the constitutional protection of the abortion decision 
would have to focus on the different moral visions that lead to differ-
ent specific results. These moral visions quite obviously place different 
values on fetal life and a woman's ability to control her body. The 
evaluation process would have to address why this is so, and it could 
omit neither the necessary evaluation of the nature of human life nor 
an acknowledged choice about the attributes that are necessary to be 
a member of the constitutional community. 
Similarly, in cases involving the constitutional restrictions on the 
intersection of government and religion, like County of Allegheny, the 
evaluation process would have to focus on religion and its place in the 
vision of the good that informs constitutional meaning. To the extent 
that the Constitution is said to restrict public displays of religious 
symbols, the decision maker would need to consider not only how that 
restriction benefits the feelings of religious outsiders, but also why 
that benefit is a greater good than the feelings of identification others 
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would have were the displays permitted. On the other hand, to the 
extent that the Constitution permits public use of religious symbols, 
the evaluation would have to be in terms of the good realized thereby 
as compared to alternate goods that are necessarily foreclosed. 
B. Creating the Perception of Legitimacy 
Of course, every stage in the articulate decision-making process 
involves articulation by various participants in various ways. The writ-
ten opinion, however, is the decision maker's formal articulation to the 
public, explaining the discovery and generation of the public values 
that inform the constitutional principles that it announces. 
Most fundamentally, the decision maker must craft the written 
opinion so that it represents a genuine attempt at communicative ac-
tion between the decision maker and the public.246 In addition, the 
written opinion must display to public view the extent to which the 
decision reflects the components of enhanced legitimacy built into the 
articulate decision-making process. As to augmented perspectives, the 
written decision would set out the range of perspectives considered,246 
The written opinion would also display the evaluation process as ex-
plained earlier. Thus, the written decision would actively consider and 
evaluate these perspectives, rather than merely mention them. 
Moreover, the opinion ideally would display both the specific per-
spectives on the issue to be decided and their most basic sources. The 
evaluation process displayed in the decision therefore would indicate 
the many commonalities and differences among perspectives. Further, 
in addition to using the method of articulacy to display the extent to 
which the constitutional meaning represents augmented perspectives, 
the written opinion would present whatever result it reached articu-
lately-that is, couched within the broader moral vision that informs 
it. In all of these ways, the presentation of the constitutional decision 
would display, to the greatest extent possible, the structure upon 
which the particular constitutional meaning depends. 
This written opinion requirement obviously would change the ap-
pearance of the opinions in cases such as Casey and County of Alle-
gheny. Gone would be the caustic comments about each side's infidel-
ity to constitutional meaning and the lengthy excursions through 
history and precedent to justify the chosen meaning. In their place 
would be the interactive examination of the values described above 
that should inform constitutional meaning. Of course, history and pre-
ced~nt might still be quite relevant to constitutional meaning, and 
245. See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
246. This means that the written opinion should at least acknowledge the existence of the 
amicus briefs filed in the case. 
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caustic comments may be justified, but both would require explana-
tion. This explanation would need to focus on the choice between 
competing conceptions of the good, which then could explain why his-
tory, precedent, or caustic comments would apply. 
C. Interaction Between the Substance and Perception of 
Legitimacy 
An articulate decision serves the important function of honestly 
recording the decision's past by displaying to public view what actu-
ally happened. Yet the legitimacy enhancing effect of the articulate 
decision-making process is more complex. The fact that it must pro-
duce an articulate decision as described above will necessarily affect 
the earlier decision-making process itself. The requirement of an ar-
ticulate decision thus serves as the important discipline that ensures 
that the decision maker actually engages in the articulate decision-
making process. The written opinion requirement works together dia-
lectically with the process to result in a written opinion that represents 
a synthesis different from what could have been predicted at the start 
of the process. 
By recording the past, the articulate decision also serves as a ve-
hicle for change in the future decision-making process. Recording the 
process that occurred changes the expectations of what the process 
will be. Therefore, for example, more participants may decide to enter 
the process if it becomes apparent that the decision maker will treat 
their perspectives with respect. Greater participation in the constitu-
tional decision-making process could increase its legitimacy by adding 
to the range of perspectives included, at least to the extent of being 
listened to, and perhaps to the extent of influencing the decision itself. 
The more perspectives considered, the greater the potential for the 
decision maker to demonstrate that the decision is independent of its 
own preferences. To the extent that the decision maker brings those 
previously excluded into the constitutional decision-making process by 
considering their perspectives, the decision may become more legiti-
mate in the eyes of those individuals or groups. 
The display and evaluation of the perspectives considered also 
might change the substance of participation. Because of the nature of 
legal advocacy, articulate decision making ultimately would place re-
sponsibility not only on the decision maker, but also on the partici-
pants. Participants in the decision-making process would learn that 
they must articulate their perspectives on the particular issue in terms 
of its motivating moral vision. • 
Of course, articulating such a perspective first requires determin-
ing what the perspective is: those who have not previously been asked 
or allowed to articulate their perspectives on an issue may not have 
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thought about what their perspectives are. The requirement of articu-
lacy therefore may induce the creation of perspectives by indicating to 
previous nonparticipants that their perspectives will be included and 
considered, thereby causing these new participants to form a perspec-
tive by articulating it. 247 
In addition, the process of articulating a perspective can change 
it, because articulation can lead to critical self-examination. The 
speaker may notice inconsistencies in the perspective when putting it 
into words. Once a speaker is asked to acknowledge a perspective as 
her own, she may examine it more critically to determine whether it is 
hers or rather something she has just accepted unquestioningly. In ad-
dition, claiming a perspective as her own requires the speaker to test 
the perspective against other perspectives and to choose to retain it. 
The crucial task of articulating a perspective thus requires effort on 
the part of the speaker. The speaker must identify a perspective as the 
speaker's own and take responsibility for it. 
The requirement of articulacy within a perspective asks the par-
ticipant to identify the deeper roots of the more specific perspective. 
This requires the participant to identify and acknowledge the personal 
and societal influences that lead to the perspective, which differ from 
those of others. This requires the participant to trace back the story 
that led to the current position.248 This process, too, may involve criti-
cal self-examination as the participant tries to make sense of the per-
spective and to articulate it in a way that others can understand it.249 
In addition, requiring articulacy should cause a participant to com-
pare his perspective with others at various levels, which may lead the 
participant to change his perspective.260 In any event, the process re-
quires the participant to take responsibility for the perspective in a 
deeper way than currently is expected. This task, although onerous, 
could hone the perspectives on constitutional meaning presented to the 
Court, making the Court's efforts to understand and evaluate the per-
spectives more meaningful. 
Thus, an articulate decision may change the expectations about 
participation in the constitutional decision-making process. Undergo-
ing the introspection required to present an articulate perspective 
may, in turn, change the nature of the perspectives ultimately 
presented for review by the decision maker. This change may affect 
the ultimate result. In this way, the method of articulate decision 
247. See TAYLOR, supra note 21, at 91 ("[G]oods [or perspectives] only exist for us through 
some articulation."). 
248. /d. at 104 ("[T)he path to articulacy has to be a historical one.' ') . 
249. PERRY, supra note 205, at 105-12 (noting requirement of intelligibility to participate 
in dialogue). 
250. Michelman, supra note 89, at 1526 (stipulating that the dialogue he proposes presumes 
that some participants will change their perspectives as a result of the dialogue) . 
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making could enhance the legitimacy of constitutional decision mak-
ing on an incremental and continuing basis. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Like the Constitution, the Court's current method of presenting 
its constitutional decisions has a pedigree.251 But as with the Constitu-
tion, the pedigree of the Court's opinion-writing style alone is now 
insufficient to sustain it. Rather, the Court's decisions must face the 
challenge of modernity-that absolute sources of authority are un-
available. Thus, logical reasoning from the traditional sources of con-
stitutional authority is insufficient to justify, and thereby legitimate, 
the result. Moreover, the Court's pretense in its opinions that such 
justification suffices exposes it to the potent criticism that it is hiding 
and not adequately legitimating the value judgments upon which its 
decisions inevitably depend. 
The Court must break out of this rut. It must acknowledge in its 
decision making its value judgments and attempt to justify them. As I 
have demonstrated, such justification is possible, contrary to what I 
suspect are the Court's fears. The twin components of articulacy and 
augmenting perspectives can supplement the traditional exercise of 
giving principles to legitimate constitutional decision making. Articu-
late decision making combines these components in a method that 
would harmonize the rhetoric and the reality of the Court's decisions, 
and thereby reestablish the Court's constitutional interpretive legiti-
macy as we enter the twenty-first century. 
251. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176 ( 1803) (observing that judicial 
review of the constitutionality of legislative acts might not be available is "an absurdity too gross 
to be insisted on") . 
